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Information security and security testing is important for software companies because
even if their own information has not been compromised one bad news about badly imple-
mented security can cause irreparable affects to market value and future sales. Standalone
vulnerability scanners can be used to implement security testing easily but real effecti-
veness and functionality how they work remain in the dark if the security tester does not
know enough about penetrations testing, technologies used in the software and methods
that is used to reveal vulnerabilities.
A Finnish software company M-Files has developed M-files Web Service that is REST li-
ke HTTP API for communicating between their document management system and client
applications for web and mobile platforms. The goal of my master thesis was to study web
application security testing and understand functionality, limitations and technical chal-
lenges of standalone vulnerability scanners for web applications. Also it was suggested
and implemented solutions that improve the results when M-Files Web Service was scan-
ned by using a standalone vulnerability scanner. The reconnaissance phase was improved
by creating an application that retrieves information of every method of M-Files Web Ser-
vice directly from the source code and sends valid requests to the scanner by using this
information. The attack surface is always up-to date and any shortcomings caused by ina-
dequate documentation or environment are defeated. This component improved testing
coverage compared to the previous manual solution by 125 percent. Second component
that was created was POC extension to OWASP ZAP that improves active scanning by
ensuring that the environment is in the best state to reveal vulnerabilities by executing pre-
steps before every attack request sent by OWASP ZAP. The solution required modification
to core source codes of OWASP ZAP but it was proofed that suggestion could work and
produce better result. Some issues caused by the created customization to OWASP ZAP
left without solutions so this component is not yet ready for production.
ii
TIIVISTELMÄ
TANELI UUSIKORPI: Testikattavuuden parantaminen testattaessa HTTP rajapintaa
Web-sovelluksille tarkoitetulla automaattisella haavoittuvuusskannerilla
Tampereen teknillinen yliopisto
Diplomityö, 85 sivua
Maaliskuu 2018
Automaatiotekniikan DI-tutkintoohjelma
Pääaine: Automaatio- ja informaatioverkot
Tarkastajat: Professori Hannu Koivisto ja yliopisto-opettaja Mikko Salmenperä
Avainsanat: Tietoturvatestaus, tietoturvatyökalut, DAST, OWASP ZAP, REST
Tietoturva ja tietoturvatestaus on tärkeää ohjelmistoyrityksille, koska vaikka heidän oma
datansa ei vaarantuisikaan, yksikin huono uutinen liittyen huonosti toteutettuun tieto-
turvaan voi aiheuttaa korjaamattomia vaikutuksia markkina-arvoon ja tuleviin kauppoi-
hin. Automaattisia haavoittuvuusskannereita voidaan helposti ottaa käyttoon tietoturva-
testauksessa, mutta niiden todellinen toimivuus ja toimintaperiaatteet jäävät pimentoon,
jos tietoturvatestaajalla ei ole tietämystä penetraatiotestauksesta, ohjelmistossa käytetyis-
tä teknologioista ja menetelmistä, joita käytetään haavoittuvuuksien paljastamiseen.
Suomalainen ohjelmistoyritys M-Files on kehittänyt julkisen REST arkkitehtuuria seu-
raavan HTTP ohjelmistorajapinnan M-Files Web Servicen kommunikoidakseen kehittä-
mänsä dokumenttienhallintaohjelman ja web- sekä mobiilikäyttöliittymien välillä. Tämän
työn tavoitteena on tutkia web-sovellusten tietoturvatestausta, ymmärtää web-sovelluksil-
le tarkoitettujen haavoittuvuusskannereiden toimintaperiaatteet, rajoitukset sekä tekniset
haasteet sekä ehdottaa ja toteuttaa ratkaisuja, jotka parantavat tuloksia, kun M-Files Web
Servicen tietoturvaa testataan käyttämällä automaattisia haavoittuvuusskannereita. Tie-
dusteluvaihetta kehitettiin luomalla sovellus, joka hakee tiedon kaikista M-Files Web Ser-
vicen metodeista suoraan lähdekoodista ja lähettää sopivat viestit skannerille käyttämällä
haettuja tietoja. Tällä tavalla hyökkäyspinta on aina ajan tasalla ja dokumentaation se-
kä ympäristön aiheuttamista puutteista päästään eroon. Sovellus paransi testikattavuutta
edelliseen manuaaliseen menetelmään verrattuna 125 prosenttia. Toinen toteutettu kom-
ponentti oli demolaajennus OWASP ZAP:iin, joka paransi aktiivista skannausta varmis-
tamalla että ympäristö on parhaassa tilassa paljastamaan haavoittuvuuksia lähettämällä
viestejä, jotka toteuttivat esiehtoja, ennen jokaista OWASP ZAP:n lähettämää hyökkäys-
viestiä. Ratkaisu edellytti, että OWASP ZAP:n lähdekoodia muutettiin, joten ratkaisu ei
ole yleisesti toteutettavissa. Saatiin kuitenkin todistettua, että ratkaisu voisi toimia ja pa-
rantaa testaustuloksia. Toteutukseen jäi vielä muutamia ongelmia, jotka liittyivät OWASP
ZAP:iin tehtyyn muutokseen, joten komponentti ei ole vielä valmis tuotantokäyttöön.
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11. INTRODUCTION
It is easy to make a vulnerable web application. Even an experienced software developer
makes mistakes and creates unknowingly vulnerabilities to the software. Vulnerability
issues are also very difficult to find because they do not have any remarkable effects
to normal functionality and are difficult to find in ordinary testing. The application can
work perfectly without any security details have been considered. For this reason, security
testing is always necessary. Its purpose is to find vulnerabilities by ethically attacking
the application or using vulnerability scanners that automatically identify known security
vulnerabilities. Software companies can order security testing from third party companies,
if the company feels that they do not have enough money, time or knowledge to test
security properly itself. In any case it is important that software companies also execute
their own security testing to ensure that security of the software is really at the appropriate
level and not blindly trust that these third party penetration testers and external security
audits can find every vulnerability of the software.
Standalone vulnerability scanners for web applications seems to be quite easy to use but
actual principles how they work remain in the dark if the tester does not have needed
knowledge about security testing, penetration testing or technologies used in the software.
These tools are also designed to provide best results for generic web applications. If the
structure or functionalities of a tested web application is not ordinary or it acts differently
as a testing tool expects it leads worse testing accuracy and coverage. Problems are also
difficult to notice only by looking the results of the testing tool because these does reveal
any info how many vulnerability have not been found.
The goal of my master thesis was to study web application security testing and unders-
tand the basic functionalities of standalone vulnerability scanners for web applications.
Collected information was then used to improve security testing of M-Files Web Service
that is REST-like HTTP API used in M-Files Web and M-Files Mobile applications and
is also weakest link before M-Files DMS (Document Management System) server that is
used to store confidential information. The main goal was not to verify what is the best
vulnerability scanner in the market but to clarify common problems and technical challen-
ges related to all vulnerability scanners and made suggestions how these problems could
be overcome by creating additional tools and extensions.
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For proving the suggestions it was created two components in this master thesis. These
both improve security testing coverage of M-Files Web Service when it was tested by
using a standalone vulnerability scanner. The first created component is an application
that automates previously manually executed reconnaissance phase. It retrieves details
of all methods of M-Files Web Service by using source code where the web service is
implemented. Parsed information was used to teach a standalone vulnerability scanner as
well as possible by using always up to date information without human intervention. The
methods were decided to retrieve directly from source code so that shortages in the docu-
mentation and previous manual teaching method can be bypass. The second component
was an proof of concept extension to one vulnerability scanner OWASP ZAP (The Open
Web Application Security Project - Zed Attack Proxy). It uses the information learned in
the first component to maintain preconditions of the methods while active vulnerability
scanner is on-going.
Second chapter of this master thesis defines generally what is meant by information secu-
rity, different methods to model information security and basics about cyber attacks and
threat modeling. Common technologies and vulnerabilities related to web applications are
explained in the third chapter. The fourth chapter explains what is meant by security tes-
ting techniques vulnerability assessment and penetration testing and described the func-
tionality and typical structure of vulnerability scanners for web applications. Strengths,
limitations and technical challenges were also discussed in this chapter. In the end of
this fourth chapter it is explained features of OWASP Zed Attack Proxy that is free open
source intercepting proxy and vulnerability scanner. It is used to test created solutions.
The fifth chapter clarifies the security testing of M-Files Web and problems, which are
encountered when security testing is executed by using OWASP ZAP. The sixth chapter
defines how the testing coverage was improved by explaining in detail how the created
components were implemented. In last chapter there is conclusion.
32. INFORMATION SECURITY
The purpose of information security is to prevent access to information from those who
should not have access but still provide a safe and reliable connection for those who have
rights. There is a well-known quote that says: "The only truly secure system is one that
is powered off, cast in a block of concrete and sealed in a lead-lined room with armed
guards and even then I have my doubts"[25]. The system described in the quote would be
indeed secure but how about productivity? The system wouldn’t be usable anymore and
productivity would be near to zero. When developing information security it is important
to understand that when security level is increased it is often done by destroying produc-
tivity. The cost of security should not exceed the value of secured information. Security
planning is finding balance between protection, usability and cost. [1]
2.1 Modeling Information Security
It is difficult to discuss security issues and information security without common termi-
nology. For this reason, it is helpful to use predefined model as a baseline of discussion.
Information security and security issues can be modeled in various ways but two general-
ly familiar models are CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) triad and the Parkerian
Hexad. CIA triad categorize information security to three parts: confidentiality, integrity
and availability. The Parkedian Hexad adds three categories more to CIA model, which
are possession, authenticity and utility.
2.1.1 CIA triad
Information security is traditionally categorized to three parts: confidentiality, integrity
and availability. This is also known as the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA)
triad (Figure 2.1). These principles are explained in following paragraphs in more detail.
Confidentiality is sometimes wrongly perceived as the same thing as privacy but these
don’t entirely mean the same. Confidentiality is one primary component of privacy but it
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Figure 2.1 Principles of CIA triad. Classical way how information security is described.
also contains other elements that isn’t always included in privacy. For example, confiden-
tiality is lost also when you lose a laptop that contain confidential data, when a hacker
has penetrated in your system or when you sent an e-mail to a wrong person. Not on-
ly when your confidential information is used without your permission like in privacy.
The confidentiality contains all things, which privacy has, but includes also things when
information has been reached by a crime or by an accident. [1]
Integrity of a system is lost when a data or portions of data has been changed or deleted
in an unauthorized or undesirable way. It is also lost when there isn’t any way to reverse
authorized changes that need to be undone. To maintain integrity, it is needed to prevent
all unauthorized changes to the data but also add ability to rollback authorized changes.
Integrity is important especially for data that is used for decisions because otherwise at-
tackers has the ability to change decisions according their preferences by changing infor-
mation so that wrong decisions are made. [1]
Availability of information is lost when any authorized person does not have access to
the data when needed. It is required that at least one part in the chain to the information
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has been broken. For example, these breaks can happen in power loss, operating system or
application problems, network attacks, compromise of a system or other problem which
prevent authorized users to view and modify a data they need. Attacks against availability
principle are called DoS (Denial of Service) attacks. [1]
2.1.2 The Parkerian Hexad
The Parkerian hexad is more complex version of classic CIA. It has a total of six principles.
First three principles are same as in CIA triad. Other three are possession or control, aut-
henticity and utility. The reason for this model is to fill the gaps of CIA triad because CIA
is too technology driven and does not consider the human element of information security.
Difference of principles in the Parkedian hexad can be understood more easily if they are
grouped in pairs. First group is confidentiality and possession, second is integrity and aut-
henticity, and third availability and utility. These principles and pairs are shown in figure
2.2 where principles are drawn around security and pairs are drawn with the same color.
These pairs and how principles added in the Parkerian hexad modify the classic CIA triad
model is explained next.
Confidentiality and Possession
Possession or control principle differs from confidentiality principle so that even if infor-
mation is stolen confidentiality is not always breached. For example, when an encrypted
memory stick is stolen the confidentiality of data is not compromised because criminal
cannot open the encryption and see what is written to the memory stick. The possession
of data is however compromised because the owner of data does not have access to it and
the control of data is in the hands of criminals. [1]
Integrity and Authenticity
In the Parkerian hexad integrity principle refers to integrity of data and the integrity of
authentication information is divided to the separate authenticity principle. For example,
if the user information of event log entry is altered to different user, as who has made the
operation, the authenticity of event log is violated. Digital signatures is usually used to
enforce authenticity of data. [1]
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Figure 2.2 Principles of the Parkerian hexad. Colors of principles describe principle pairs
Availability and Utility
There are two principles in the Parkerian hexad which explains how the using of the data
can be prevented. These are availability and utility. Availability refers to that the whole
service is unavailable and it means the same thing as in CIA model while utility refers to
the usability of the data. This refers to a situation where criminals have got an access to the
confidential information but the information is not in the form that criminals can use. For
example, if the information is encrypted the information is not very usable for criminals.
Passwords are usually in encrypted form in the database because of that principle. Even
if password information is compromised criminals can’t use this information. [1]
2.2 Cyber Attacks and Threat Modelling
Cyber-attack is an attack, which is targeted to computer systems, technology-dependent
enterprises or networks [28]. There are many different types of cyber-attacks. Before we
can find out which particular cyber-attack can have an effect to our business it is important
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to understand what is meant by terms threat, vulnerability and risk.
A threat is an existing situation that can cause harm. For example, there can exist a virus
which might pose a threat to a Windows operating system. Threats are often environment
specific because it is usual that the same virus hasn’t any affect to Linux operating sys-
tems. Vulnerabilities are holes in the system, which enable the attack specified in a threat.
A vulnerability might exist in the operating system, in the application or in the building
where the office is located. For example, a threat can be that criminals break into the wa-
rehouse and the vulnerability, which provide this attack, is that the door of the warehouse
can be opened by a screwdriver. If both a threat and a vulnerability exist then we have a
risk that something bad might happen. If either is missing, then the risk does not exist. For
example, if there aren’t any valuable articles in the warehouse then there isn’t any threats
that a burglary happens and if there aren’t any vulnerabilities, which allow that criminals
can break into the warehouse, but the threat still exist the risk disappear. So that the risk
can be mitigated we should improve either physical, logical or administrative control. [1]
Different helpful questions about the system can help the administrator of the system to
figure out the cyber-attacks, which the system might encounter. Questions can be such as:
How the system can be exploit?
Where the most confidential information is located?
If this is not enough for good results these questions can be formed more specifically by
using some existing threat model, which categorizes these threats. With these models it
is easier to find every place where these threats can locate. They also help one to think
threats in right perspective. There are different methods to model threats. One way, which
Microsoft introduced, is STRIDE model [14]. This model propose that threats can be
grouped to six categories:
• Spoofing Identity refers to a threat where the authentication information of a user,
such as a username and a password, is illegally accessed and then used in order to
present as another user. [14]
• Tampering with data refers to a threat where a confidential information has been
criminally modified via unauthorized access without that it has been noticed. This
contains changes in the database where the information is held and the alteration of
data when it has been sent between two computers over the public network. [14]
• Repudiation refers to a threat where a user denies performing an action and the-
re isn’t any way to prove otherwise. For example, if this user has executed illegal
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action in the system and the system does not have capability to trace this illegal ac-
tion. Nonrepudiation refers to the ability of a system to prevent repudiation threats.
In this case the system would have perfect event log where this illegal action could
have been traced and ability to point the action to the right person. [14]
• Information Disclosure refers to a threat where individuals who aren’t supposed
to have access to a resource have ability to view or read it. For example, if users can
open a document, which they were not granted to open, or criminals can listen the
transmission between two computers. [14]
• Denial of service refers to a threat where a system is temporary unavailable or
unusable because of a natural disaster or a denial of service attack caused by crimi-
nals. [14]
• Elevation of privileges refers to a threat where an unprivileged user has a way to
gain privileged access and can compromise and destroy the entire system. [14]
Questions which can be formulated by using STRIDE model can be for example:
S How an attacker can access the authentication information?
T Can someone modify messages when these are transmitted over Internet?
R Is every important operation which user can made logged to the event log?
I Can someone listen messages when these are transmitted over Internet?
D How our system can manage a DoS attack?
E Are every administrator interfaces in the system secure?
If some of these threats has been established always at least one principle in CIA or the
Parkerian hexad is going to be violated. When spoofing identity threat has been establis-
hed, it violates particularly authenticity principle but in the worst case also many other
principles can be violated if this spoofed identity can be used to login in the system. Con-
fidentiality principle is violated if documents can be opened and Integrity principle is vio-
lated if documents can be modified. If there is possibility to change the password of the
user, the criminal can take the account under control and possession principle is violated.
When tampering with data threat exists it violates integrity principle because then there
is possibility that data is modified. When repudiation threat exists, it violates authenticity
principle because then the system lacks user information for example in event log. Any
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user can say that they didn’t make some specific operation and there isn’t any evidence
prove that otherwise. When information disclosure threat has been occurred, it violates
confidentiality principle because then confidential information is leaked. When denial of
service threat exists, there is possibility that availability principle can be violated. When
elevation of privileges has been established, it can cause big disaster. Attacker can take
whole system under a control, destroy whole system, read every document, modify docu-
ments but stay still invisible, modify authenticity information in event log or make whole
information unusable. So in the worst case every principle in information security can be
violated.
Cyber attacks can be very dangerous also when these are done against a software that
you have sold. Even if your own information is not compromised in the cyber attack
the information of your customers have been compromised. News related to this causes
irreparable affects to a market value and future sales of your company and in a worse
case can even lead to bankruptcy. For this reason, it is important for software companies
that they invest in the security of their software and ensures that their software complies
with current security regulations. Security of the software can be improved by raising
awareness about security among developers and invest in a good security testing team or
purchase the security testing from a third part company that is focused and are experts in
security testing.
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3. VULNERABILITIES IN WEB APPLICATIONS
It is easy to make a vulnerability to a web application. The created web application can
work perfectly without that any security details have been considered. Security issues in
these applications can also remain unfixed if the developers or the software testers are not
familiar how vulnerabilities are exploited and what technologies used in web applications
enable these vulnerabilities. The security can be improved by increasing awareness about
the technologies which are used in web application, learning methods that are used reveal
vulnerabilities and understanding main enablers that make vulnerabilities possible.
3.1 Web Applications
In the past, the World Wide Web contained only static web sites and other static docu-
ments linked to the sites. Communication was mostly one-way, from server to browser
and authentication was rarely used because it was usually only wanted that every user
saw the same content on a web site. Attackers also rarely gained access to sensitive in-
formation because everything was already public. Today the majority of web sites are
web applications. They support multiple features like registration, login, financial tran-
sactions, search, dynamically generated content that is often user specific and they rely on
two-way information exchange. In other words, web applications are client-server softwa-
res in which the client is run in a web browser. Web applications have been created a lot
nowadays for many reasons. Most important reason is that there is no need to install sepa-
rate client software because every web user already have a browser installed on their every
web device and they already know how to use it. Changes to user interface can be done
on the server and these are immediately taken in use. HTTP (Hypertext transfer protocol)
that is used as communication protocol in web application brings many useful features
to a web application like connectionless communication, tunneling over other protocols
and possibility for secure communication. Lots of open source code and other resources
are also publicly available for helping to develop web applications more easily. Various
HTTP APIs like RESTful web services are used for communication between a client and
a server. JavaScript is used in the client side to create dynamically generated menus and
lists and sending requests to other services. [27, p. 2-6]
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3.1.1 HTTP
Hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) is a message-based communication protocol used wi-
dely in the World Wide Web and in all web applications created these days. The protocol
was originally used for transferring static text-based resources but nowadays it is also
used in complex distributed applications because it is easy to utilize to different situa-
tions. In HTTP protocol, there is always a client and a server. The client sends a HTTP
request message, which the server process and returns a HTTP response message back to
the client. HTTP is a connectionless protocol but stateful TCP (Transmission Control Pro-
tocol) can be used as a transport mechanism for HTTP messages. It makes each request
and response an autonomous transaction. [27, p. 39–40]
Both a HTTP request and a HTTP response message have a start-line, zero or more header
field lines and an empty line to inform that the header of a message is ended. After the
empty line there can be optional message body. HTTP message types have divergent start-
lines. In a HTTP request it is called request-line and in a HTTP response it is called status-
line. Format of start-line of HTTP request is:
[HTTP method] [URL] [HTTP version]
and for example it can look like this:
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
HTTP method is verb which specify the operation that should be executed in the server
for the resource specified in the URL. Most common methods are GET, POST, PUT
and DELETE. Get method is used when a resource is intended to retrieve from the
web server, POST method is used to execute actions PUT method is used to upload a
resource and DELETE is used to delete a resource. Every method has their intended
purpose but there aren’t any restrictions to use these differently. [4, p. 21–33]
URL (Uniform Resource Locator) defines the resource where the operation defined in
HTTP method should be targeted. URLs in web follows format:
protocol://hostname[:port]/[path/]resource[?param=value]
and for example can look like this
http://www.domain.com:8080/folder/main.html?search=cat
where protocol defines communication protocol and hostname defines domain or
IP address of the web server. Port is optional parameter and is necessary to define
only if non-default port is used. After that the path to the resource and resource
name is specified and after the question mark it is possible to specify query para-
meters.
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HTTP version specifies the protocol version, which the client uses and the web server
should also be followed.
The status line that is the start line of HTTP response message has three element and
follows a format:
[HTTP version] [Status-code] [Reason phrase]
and for example it can look like this:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
It starts with HTTP version and follows with a 3-digit status-code indicating the result of
the request and an reason phrase that describes the status code in human readable form.
Status-codes have been divided to five groups according their first digit:
1xx — Informational
2xx — The request succeeded.
3xx — The request is redirected to a different resource.
4xx — The request fails because the request has error.
5xx — The request fails because server encountered an error.
For example status-code 201 means that the resource was created successfully, 404 means
that the asked resource does not exist and 503 means the service is unavailable. [27, p.
48-49]
Cookies are data items in HTTP protocol which are stored in the client when HTTP
response with Set-Cookie header is received from the server. The cookie resubmitted
back to the server of every HTTP request, which are sent to this same server domain, in
Cookies header. These are used specially to identify a client when a user returns to a same
web application. [27, p. 47]
HTTP requests and HTTP responses can be transmitted through a certain server by con-
figuring a browser to use HTTP Proxy server. It is a server that acts as an intermediary
between the web browser and the web server. The proxy forwards all messages reques-
ted by the browser to the server and convey their responses back to the browser. The
proxies are used for caching, authentication, access control or intercepting and modifying
requests for security testing purposes. When an unencrypted HTTP request is sent via a
proxy server, whole URL is readable and the proxy server can use this information to
forward the request to the correct server. Same thing cannot be done with an encrypted
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HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) request because the URL is encrypted. The
SSL handshake between the browser and the proxy server cannot be performed either
because this would break secure tunnel and make connection vulnerable to interception
attacks. A pure TCP-level relay is used for this reason. This allows the browser to per-
form an SSL handshake normally with the web server as the proxy server passes all data
in both directions. At first for starting this relay, the browser sends an HTTP CONNECT
request to the proxy server where the destination hostname and a port number is specified
as the URL. The proxy accepts this by returning an HTTP response with a 200 status and
keeps that TCP connection open. After that this connection is used as a pure TCP-level
relay to the destination. [27, p. 49–50]
3.1.2 Encoding Schemes
Encoding schemes are used in text based protocols and programming languages so that
unusual characters, binary data or characters, which have special meaning, can be safely
handled. Various technologies used in web applications like the HTTP protocol or the
HTML language are historically text based so these have various encoding schemes to
handle difficult situations. Without encoding the meaning of data can be changed and
messages cannot be safely transported. [27, p. 66–67]
URLs can contain only the characters in the US-ASCII (American Standard Code for
Information Interchange) character set and multiple characters in this set are also restric-
ted because these has special meaning in URL schema or in HTTP protocol. The URL-
encoding is created to encode the special characters and characters that does not belong to
US-ASCII character set inside HTTP messages. The URL-encoded character starts with
% prefix and is followed by the two-digit ASCII code of the character in hexadecimal.
For example, the space is encoded with %20 and the equal sign (=) is encoded with %3d.
[27, p. 67]
HTML encoding is used to escape characters that are used to define a document structure
in HTML. Without HTML encoding some special characters couldn’t be used inside the
content of a HTML document but would instead be understood as part of the structure
or the functionalities of the web page. For example these important characters for HTML
can escaped in the following manner:
< → &lt;
> → &gt;
" → &quot;
’ → &apos;
& → &amp;
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Characters can be HTML encoded also by using form < → &#60; where 60 presents
ASCII code of the character as decimal or form < → &#x3c; where 3c presents ASCII
code of the character as hexadecimal. [27, p. 68–69]
3.1.3 RESTful Web Services
RESTful web services and APIs (Application Programming Interface) are services, which
follow principles and constrains of Representational State Transfer (REST) architectural
style. RESTful web services, which are implemented by using HTTP are often used by
web applications to communicate between a client and a server. It is important to notice
that REST is just an architectural style and not a technology, a communication protocol
or a set of standards that have specific rules to implement. REST has set of constraints
and principles, which have been found to be good guidelines when programming inter-
faces for distributed applications and hypermedia systems. It is designed to improve per-
formance, scalability, simplicity, reconfigurability, portability and reliability of interfaces.
Simply REST-compliant or RESTful web services follow client-server model where the
connections are stateless. All in all, REST is a hybrid of multiple different architectural
styles and can be defined by six constraints:
1. Client-Server
By requiring separate client and server solutions, the user interfaces in the client
solutions and data storage in the server solution will be isolated and these can be
developed independently. Portability will be improved because client solutions for
multiple platforms can be created without that these should worry how the data
storage is managed. Scalability will be improved because now the server can be
much simpler. [5, p. 76][8, p. 27]
2. Stateless
Stateless communication means that each request sent to the server should contain
all necessary information to be understood without any client context is stored on
the server. Clients are responsible to store session state. These improve reliability of
the service because without state in the server it is easier to roll back when failure
happens. This makes possible to scale the server for bigger environments and make
scaling simple because the server can release the resource as soon as the related
request is handled and it does not have to wait following requests to understand the
full purpose of the request. However, statelessness increase the repetitive data in
a series of requests, which may decrease network performance, because any data
about context is not stored in the server. Cache constrain, which is explained next,
is added to REST to overcome this issue. [5, p. 78][8, p. 28]
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3. Cache
Cache constrain is added to REST for improving network efficiency by eliminating
some client interactions to the server and reducing average latency in series of inte-
ractions. For fulfill this constrain there should be possible to implicitly or explicitly
set data elements in the response to be cached or not. The disadvantage here is that
this may decrease the reliability of the data.[5, p. 79]
4. Uniform Interface
By requiring uniform interface, the system architecture is simplified and the visibili-
ty between interactions is improved. Also by defining uniform interface, REST adds
most visible and recognizable guiding principles to the architectural style. These
are identification of resources, resource manipulation through representations, self-
descriptive messages and HATEOAS (Hypermedia as the Engine of Application
State). These are explained better in following chapters. [5, p. 81-82]
5. Layered System
In layered system, components and resources are divided to hierarchical layers and
it is constrained that each component can see only the layer which they are inte-
racting with. These layers prevent the system to become too complex by guiding
to divide matching functionalities to own layers. Components can be simplified by
moving rarely used functionalities to another layer or legacy services and new ser-
vices can be divided to own layers so that new and legacy clients can be used si-
multaneously. This also allows that the API can be split to multiple software and
hardware. Proxies, gateways and firewalls can be used at various points without that
the interface of the API is necessary to change. [5, p. 82-83]
6. Code-On-Demand
In REST, it is allowed but not forced that client functionality can be extended by
executable code downloaded from the server. This optional code-on-demand con-
strain improves system extensibility and simplifies implementation of client solu-
tion because some features can be created and administered in the server side and
these does not have to be implemented one by one to every client solution. [5, p.
82-84]
By implementing these six constraints, it is possible to achieve main design goals of REST
architectural style which are independent deployment of the components, encapsulation of
legacy systems, general interfaces, reduced latency, high security of service interactions,
scalability and high performance. [5][8]
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It is not restricted what communication protocol is used when RESTful API is implemen-
ted but because REST architectural style was created beside HTTP protocol and especial-
ly for network based applications it is very popular in the HTTP world. Better results
are often achieved when REST is implemented by using HTTP protocol. REST relies in
existing features in HTTP and for this reason the constraints and principles of REST are
easier to fulfill by using HTTP. [5, p. 100][8]
REST is just architectural style and does not specify exactly how it should be utilized
by using HTTP protocol. Lack of clarity in the right implementation has caused multiple
different constantly evolving best practices, opinions and false conclusions how RESTful
web services should be implemented by using HTTP. In the next, REST principles are
explained in detail by following one recommended best practices documentation. [6]
In REST, functionalities and data are divided to nouns so-called resources and these re-
sources are managed and found via resource identifier by using standard methods. Re-
source can be any information that can be named such as document, customer, order,
image or service but also collection of things like documents, customers or orders and
so on. Good resource identifiers should follow easily understandable hierarchical struc-
ture, which also define relationships between resources and should also be predictable in
consistent way so that they can be predict in any time. Selected resource names should
increase understandability of RESTful API by providing context for a request. When re-
source hierarchy and resource names are designed well understandability increases, the
service is easy to use and is intuitive even without documentation. [5, p. 88][6, p. 6, 14 ]
URIs are used as resource identifiers of RESTful API when REST is utilized to create
HTTP API. For example in a system that contains customers and orders created by the
customer an appropriate URI to retrieve information of all customers in the system could
be listed with request.
GET http://my.domain.com/restapi/customers
and informations of customer which id is 1234 can retrieved with request
GET http://my.domain.com/restapi/customers/1234.
It can be possible that all orders can be listed by using request
GET http://my.domain.com/restapi/orders
but this is not probably as intuitive to use as a request
GET http://my.domain.com/restapi/customers/1234/orders,
which also defines the relationship between customer and orders and will return only
orders which are created by that specific customer. It is also possible that the system
providers both resource hierarchies at the same time because in REST it is allowed that
multiple URIs points to same resource. Continuing this, both requests
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GET http://my.domain.com/restapi/customers/1234/orders/5678
GET http://my.domain.com/restapi/orders/5678
could point to the same order resource in the example system. [6, p. 11-15 ]
Multiple different HTTP features are used for utilizing the uniform interface constrain of
REST. As explained above URIs are used to identify resources. In additional to this HTTP
methods are utilized as standard method for handling CRUD (Create, Read, Update, and
Delete) operations for a resource general way. Most important method for RESTful Web
Services are GET, POST, PUT and DELETE and best practices suggests that these should
be used for following actions:
GET method should be used when a specific representation of a resource is requested.
POST method should be used when a new resource is created to the collection.
PUT method should be used when a existing resource is updated or when a new resource
is created with the ID which is selected by the client.
DELETE method should be used when a resource is deleted.
Both POST and PUT methods can be used to create new resources but they should be used
differently. When POST is used, the creation request is targeted to a collection resource
so that when a request like
POST http://my.domain.com/restapi/customers
is executed it creates a new customer to customers collection with a ID that is chosen by
the server. When PUT is used for creation the client choose the ID for the resource that
will be created if the id does not yet exist. For example a reguest
PUT http://my.domain.com/restapi/customers/1234
creates new customer with the ID defined in the URI if the id does not yet exist. If the ID
already exist the details of this customer is updated with values given in the body. [6, p.
11–15]
Best practices and REST API implementations have biggest differences in how POST
and PUT method should be used. Which one should be used for resource creation and
which one should be used for updating an existing resource or should both creation and
update be possible for each method. Before it is possible to understand actions which
were suggested here for POST and PUT it is necessary to understand what is meant by
idempotence.
So that an operation is idempotent it should not have difference if the client makes iden-
tical request once or multiple times. End results should be always same on the server side.
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Methods GET, HEAD and OPTIONS are idempotent because these should not change
anything on the server. It is also defined that PUT and DELETE methods should be idem-
potent and POST method should be used for non-idempotent requests. For this reason,
POST method should be used when a new resource is created directly to the collection by
using URI of collection resource. If the identical POST creation request is sent multiple
times it causes multiple new resources to the server, which means that the operation is
not idempotent. This does not happen with PUT method in the suggested creation usage
because a new resource is created only at the first request and after that identical request
only update values with same information as in the creation. This does not change anyt-
hing on the server so the operation is idempotent. DELETE method is idempotent on
server side but a client sees usually different response if the same resource is tried to de-
lete second time. The resource is not findable anymore and the second deletion causes not
found error.
All requests and responses in a RESTful API should be self-descriptive and have enough
information so that these can be processed without additional information. For example,
messages should specify Internet media type of content so that a correct parser can be
selected to read body data or responses should explicitly indicate how these can be cached.
The services can support multiple different media types and clients can choose which one
it uses. Usually the services support at least JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) but also
XML is quite typical. These both are text-based formats for serializing and transferring
data objects.
In RESTful web services, hypermedia technologies are used as engine for delivering
application state between clients and the web service. This so-called HATEOAS (Hy-
permedia as the Engine of Application State) means that hyperlinks and hypertext are
used to deliver resource statuses and relationships between resources. Client uses body
content, query-string parameters, request headers and URI to deliver client state and the
service uses body content, status codes and response headers to deliver the service state
to the client. URIs are also used in the response body as links to related resources and to
resource itself. [6, p. 7]
In REST, resources are updated by sending full representation of a resource with updated
information back to the server by using PUT method and URI for the resource. Client
knows the representation of a resource because the similar presentation can be retrieved
by using GET method for the same URI and has for this reason enough information to
update or delete the resource.
HTTP status codes are used to indicate how the request succeeded. For REST there is
commonly-accepted usage how status codes should be used that follows pretty much how
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Table 3.1 Usage of HTTP methods, URI and status codes in REST. [6, p. 13-14]
HTTP Method /customers /customer/{Customer_ID}
GET 200 (OK) Returns list of custo-
mers.
200 (OK) Returns one customer.
404 (Not Found) Customer ID
does not exist or it is invalid.
POST 200 (OK) Location header con-
tains link to the created resource.
404 (NOT FOUND)
PUT 404 (NOT FOUND) If it is not
possible to update/replace whole
collection.
201 (CREATED) If it is possible
to replace whole collection.
200 (OK) The resource updated
successfully and the representa-
tion of the updated resource is
returned in the response body.
204 (NO CONTENT) The re-
source is updated successfully
but the representation of the up-
dated resource is not returned in
the response body.
404 (NOT FOUND) Customer
ID does not exist or it is invalid.
DELETE 404 (NOT FOUND) Usually it is
not desirable that it is possible to
delete whole collection.
200 (OK) Resource deleted
successfully.
404 (NOT FOUND) Customer
ID does not exist or it is invalid.
status codes should be used in HTTP protocol. Usage of most important status codes are
explained in table 3.1. Other commonly used status codes are 401 (UNAUTHORIZED)
for indicating that a response has missing or invalid authentication token and 403 (FOR-
BIDDEN) for indicating that user does not have rights to access the resource. Sometimes
these two are replaced with 404 for security reasons so that it is impossible to resolve
existing resources in the system. [6, p. 39]
3.2 Vulnerabilities and Security Risks in Web Applications
Web applications can contain multiple different types of vulnerabilities. The vulnerabili-
ties not implemented purposely to the web application but are created by accident. Usual-
ly the easiest way to create a feature to a web application is not the most secure way.
Creating a secure web application is not easy. It always requires paying attention to infor-
mation security details and making additional implementations that fills security holes.
Existing and discovered vulnerability types are listed in many services. Often they also
explain how the vulnerability works, what harms it can cause, how it can be exploited and
how it can be prevented. OWASP Top 10 (The Open Web Application Security Project -
Top 10) project keep up-to-date list of ten most critical security risks in web applications
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[20]. In their newest list published in 2017, top 10 was:
1. Injection
2. Broken Authentication
3. Sensitive Data Exposure
4. XML External Entities (XXE)
5. Broken Access Control
6. Security Misconfiguration
7. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
8. Insecure Deserialization
9. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
10. Insufficient Logging and Monitoring
These security risks contains multiple different vulnerability types. OWASP uses CWE
(Common Weakness Enumerator) ID to identify these different vulnerability and weak-
nesses types in web applications [15]. CWE upholds a community-developer list of softwa-
re weakness types that are enumerated with CWE-ID. CWE contains own ids for weak-
ness categories, weakness classes, weakness bases and weakness variants. For example,
the CWE ID of Improper Authentication weakness class is CWE-287.
Many important languages used to develop web applications are interpreted languages
like SQL, Perl and PHP. These languages are not compiled but these are executed in real
time by using an interpreter and there is multiple use cases where the code is formed by
using user inputs in a real time. Injection vulnerabilities exist because a web application
does not sanitize user-supplied or hostile data and this input is directly used or concatenate
to construct code for a interpreted language. [20]
For example following SQL call contains injection vulnerability.
var query = "SELECT * FROM students WHERE studentID = '"
+ request.getParameter (" studentid ") + "'";
The call is vulnerable because user input is not sanitized. The vulnerability can be exploit
for example with input studentid=' or '1'='1 that change the WHERE clause to
form WHERE studentID= or '1'='1 that is always true. This causes that every record
of students table is returned. In addition to viewing confidential data, SQL injection vul-
nerabilities can cause data loss, data corruption, loss of accountability, denial of access an
in the worst case complete host takeover. [20]
The input value that is used to exploit a vulnerability is usually also called as crafted
input, attack string or attack vector. The input parameter that is vulnerable is called as
input vector. One vulnerability can have multiple different attack strings that are possible
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to use for exploiting the vulnerability. [20]
In top 10, there is two almost similar security risks broken authentication and broken
access control. Broken authentication security risk refers to vulnerabilities, which cause
weaknesses in authentication and password handling. For example, the handling is not
secured in any way to use brute force or other automated attacks against the system to
get valid username-password pairs. Also if default administrator passwords haven’t been
changed, passwords are saved as plain text or weak credential recovery process is used
refers that the authentication of the system is broken. Broken Access Control security
risk refers to vulnerabilities, which allows to bypass the access control checks or elevation
of privilege. [20]
XSS vulnerabilities enable attacks against the users of a web application. There attackers
can include own code in the web page that is executed in users’ browser. These are caused
by invalidated or unescaped used inputs that is used as part of HTML. If the input contains
for example valid JavaScript code this is executed in browsers when the web page is
shown. XSS vulnerabilities can be split to three forms: Reflected XSS, Stored XSS and
DOM XSS. In reflected XSS vulnerability, the code is implemented immediately and only
in a HTML of the next response after the crafted input is sent. A crafted input locates for
example as a query parameter in a malicious link that the attacker has lured to click by
an unaware user. That method can be used for example to hijack a session. In stored XSS
vulnerability, the code is stored to a database and is the part of HTML also when other
users or administrator view the web page. DOM XSS vulnerability is exploited similarly
as reflected XSS by using malicious links. Difference is that the code is not put into
HTML by the server but the client side scripting of the web application has access to the
browser’s document object model (DOM) and uses a parameter value in the URL without
unescaping to construct the current page. [20][27, p. 431–442]
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4. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND
PENETRATION TESTING
Vulnerabilities and other security issues are difficult to find because these don’t usual-
ly change normal functionalities of the system and for this reason weren’t occurred in
normal use or found in ordinary testing. For this reason, it is needed special testing for
finding security issues. Its purpose is to find all security issues and vulnerabilities in the
system by either scanning and seeking vulnerabilities or ethically attacking to the tested
system. Security testing is important for software companies because that way the sold
product has less security issues. This decreases the likelihood of malware attacks, service
breaks, network intrusion and data theft. Such events have effect to customers loyalty and
may cause loss in the company’s market value or cause fines and lawsuits from poorly
implemented security practices. [26]
4.1 Testing Techniques in Security testing
There is two main testing techniques for security testing: vulnerability assessment and
penetration testing. The aim of vulnerability assessment is to review services, systems and
used applications for potential security issues, whereas penetration testing goes further by
simulating hackers’ activity and actually performing attacks. Penetration testing is used
because often the found vulnerability and its consequences are understood better when
the real exploitation is demonstrated with PoC (Proof of Concept) attacks. Vulnerability
assessment is carried out at beginning of penetration testing and this phase is explained
as a phase in penetration testing in a following section. [3][7]
More precisely penetration testing is a legal and authorized attempt to locate vulnerabi-
lities of computer systems and successfully demonstrate that vulnerabilities really exist.
This is done by executing real attacks in a tested system or a test environment by using
same tools and approach as hackers. When security issues is found and demonstrated this
information is not used for crimes but these are reported to the client. For this reason,
penetration testers are often called as ethical hackers or white hat hackers. The proper pe-
netration testers also always report recommendations how and why these issues should
be fixed. More precisely the proper report should include identification of vulnerabilities,
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risk rating of each vulnerability and quantity of vulnerabilities. Identification of vulnera-
bility should contain information where and how the vulnerability is discovered and the
vulnerability type so that the vulnerability is possible to fix. Risk rating of vulnerability
can be for example Critical, High, Medium or Low which helps in fix prioritization. Wit-
hout this comprehensive report both vulnerability assessment and penetration testing is
quite useless because just stating that the system is vulnerable doesn’t provide any help-
ful information. [3][7]
Penetration testing is also divided to white box penetration testing and black box penet-
ration testing. White box penetration testing is used for finding as many vulnerabilities
as possible whereas black box testing is used for testing capability of intrusion detection
systems. The goal of white box penetration testing is to test the system security entirely.
This is done by giving as much information as possible to penetration testers and allowing
them to attack to the target system in peace so that they have best possibilities to find mul-
tiple vulnerabilities. The testing isn’t done stealthy and does not test intrusion detection
systems, incident response or early-alert systems at all. Black box penetration testing si-
mulates stealthy actions of real attacker. Penetration tester has just the information what a
skilled attacker would have or can stealthy collect. The security of the system is not tested
entirely and it isn’t intended to find all vulnerabilities. After one working vulnerability is
discovered it is prove that the system is not secure. Advantage of black box penetration
testing is to test system’s ability to detect intrusion attempts and how these intrusion at-
tempts is responded. Basically, it is tested that is it possible to attack to the target system
without that users or administration team notice the attack or attack attempt. [3]
Penetration testers do not always get all possible information because often the testing is
purchased from an external company and the customer does not want to give confidential
information to testers. It is also thought that the attackers do not have access to this infor-
mation so it isn’t important for penetration testers. However it is more reasonable explore
the system better than any hacker could do by giving more information to penetration
testers than hackers could ever have. [2]
The work of penetration testers differs from black hat hacking also in elapsed time. Ti-
me which is allocated to penetration testing is limited somewhere between one week to
couple months. Hackers can use as much time as they want so they have more time to find
one vulnerability than penetration testers have time to find all vulnerabilities. It would be
good to allocate time for penetration testing and execute it periodically. Usually organiza-
tion do that before product releases or major upgrades but it is recommended to conduct
penetration testing and security testing more often. [26]
Penetration testing and vulnerability assessment can be executed in different environ-
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ments. For example, you can test security of a building or a network. One of most com-
mon things to test is a software. This application Security Testing (AST) contains all
security testing which is executed against an application or a software. Vulnerabilities can
be sought by investigating the source code of the application or simulating attacks against
an application and then analyzing responses for vulnerabilities. When vulnerabilities are
seek directly from source code it is called SAST (Static Application Security Testing)
and when these are sought by simulating attacks it is called DAST (Dynamic Application
Security Testing). [29]
4.2 Phases of Penetration Testing
Recommended phases and tasks for penetration testing are described in penetration testing
methodologies. The best-known methodology, which is used also as de facto standard,
is OSSTMM (Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual) but there are also
other methodologies that can be followed while executing penetration testing like NIST
or Backtrack. These define tasks of penetration testing slightly differently but the same
main phases can be found in every methodology. These have common that there is a phase
or phases which should be done before actual exploitation, a phase where the exploitation
or attack is executed and a phase or phase which are executed after the exploitation. In
this writing, penetration testing is divided to three phases which are called:
1. The pre-attack phase
2. The attack phase
3. The post-attack phase
These phases simulate the phases of a real attacker but there are some differences because
motivation of attackers and penetration testers are different. [2][26]
The pre-attack phase that is also known in some methodologies as Reconnaissance and
Scanning contains all operations which penetration testers or hackers do before any real
attacks or other suspicious operations are made to target system. This phase consists plan-
ning and attempts to investigate, explore and scan the target system for discovering pos-
sible vulnerabilities. These reconnaissance operations can be categorized into two types:
passive reconnaissance and active reconnaissance. Passive reconnaissance contains ope-
rations, which does not do any detectable events to the target system. The aim is to gather
as much information as possible about the target system from secondary sources without
any possibilities to getting caught. After all possible information is got via passive recon-
naissance it is usually moved to active reconnaissance, which actually do events, which
may be detectable in the target system. In this part it is gathered information for example
a provisional map of the network infrastructure or site map of the web application. All
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information in the pre-attack phase is used when actual attack is planned and usually
hackers spend more time on this phase than on the actual attack. [2]
The attack phase or Exploitation phase in some methodologies is the phase where the ac-
tual simulated attack is executed and where all logical and physical vulnerabilities found
in the pre-attack phase are tested. This is also the phase, which differ most when it is
executed by hackers than by penetration testing team. Hackers need only one vulnerabi-
lity to compromise the whole system whereas penetration testers are interesting to found
and test as many vulnerabilities as possible because it is not known which vulnerability
an attacker is going to use at first. [2]
The last phase in penetration testing is the post attack phase, which is also known as
Post Exploitation and Maintaining Access. It is the phase where all systems, which are
altered in attacks, are restored to the original state. This phase is not necessary to do if
the penetration testing is executed in the testing environment which is created only for
this purpose and is going to be destroyed in the end. However penetration testing is often
executed in the product environment so there the resetting to initial state is essential. [2]
4.3 Tools for Web Application Penetration Testing and
Vulnerability Scanning
Manual penetration testing is very slow. This has been improved by developing multiple
different tools for seek information, speed up penetration testing by automating time-
consuming tasks and facilitate vulnerability assessment. These tools are made by an ex-
tensive team of professionals with diverse security testing skills and are very useful for all
security testers regardless of their professional skills. Professional penetration testers can
speed up their testing but also not so professional security testers can reveal severe securi-
ty issues. Fully automated or in other words standalone security testing tools are popular
in many organization which does have money to have professional security testing team
or want to automate their security testing.
Tools for application security testing can split tools for dynamic AST (DAST) and tools
for static AST (SAST). Tools for DAST contains all tools, which analyze the reactions of
the target application while simulated attacks are executed against the application. The-
se tools are also called vulnerability scanners, penetration testing tools or web hacking
frameworks or testing suites. DAST tools for web applications analyze HTTP requests to
find inputs locations, modifies requests by putting attack strings to input locations, send
the modified request and analyses responses for vulnerability signatures. Tools for SAST
are source code analysis tools. These tools seek vulnerabilities directly from the source
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code, bytecode or binary of the application. Additional of this there is nowadays also in-
teractive AST (IAST) tools that are somewhere between SAST and DAST tools. These
tools observe operations of an application and identify vulnerabilities within the applica-
tion typically as agent installed in runtime environment. [29]
4.4 Web Application Vulnerability Scanners and Intercepting
Proxies
Figure 4.1 Main mechanism and features of general intercepting proxy
The most seminal tool for dynamic web application security testing is intercepting proxy.
Main mechanism and features of this tool are explained in a figure 4.1. It is an application
that is typically configured in a browser as a proxy server. When the target application is
used in the normal way by using this configured browser the intercepting proxy monitors
network traffic between the target web application and the browser. This allows penetra-
tion tester to edit the requests, like an attacker, before they are sent to the target applica-
tion. Simultaneously intercepting proxies collects relevant information such as history
about all requests and responses and a site map that is presentation of discovered con-
tent in table or tree form. Additional to this, intercepting proxies provides multiple useful
functions for helping penetration testing tasks. For example web application spider, web
application fuzzers, automatic vulnerability scanner, passive vulnerability scanner and
possibility to manually send requests and analyze responses. [27, p. 751–752]
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4.4.1 Features
The big task at the beginning of using intercepting proxy is to define attack surface by int-
roducing all the web pages, directories and other requests that belongs to the target web
application. This can be performed manually by using the web application normally but
intercepting proxies have also automatic spidering tools for crawling the application wit-
hout human intervention. These tools request already visited or given web pages, analyze
HTML code of responses for additional links in the scope of the target application and
then requests found URLs until it does not find any new URLs, which belong to the tar-
get web application. All found links are seen in the proxy history and added to the site
map to increase attack surface. When all request types are listed in one place these can be
reviewed and passed to other tools for further analysis. [2]
A traditional web spider looks only HTML code for new links and requests but this is
rarely enough for web applications that uses forms, drop-down lists, buttons, text inputs,
JavaScripts and so on for its functionalities. JavaScript is used in the web application for
dynamically generated menus and lists or sending request to other services. Requests sent
by these functionalities are not run into by using traditional spider because traditional
spider looks only the HTML code of the responses so these needs additional approach
for that whole attack surface can be retrieved. For this reason it is created spiders, which
work better with web applications. These can for example use tools of UI test automa-
tion to fill every input and click every clickable element in the web page to execute all
possible JavaScript code. These launch requests to other services, which are collected by
intercepting proxy and added to the site map. Some web application spiders can analyze
also JavaScript codes to find additional links. [27, p. 760]
In the best case, the whole web application can be mapped by using the spider only by
giving one URL and unleash the tool. However, it is very difficult to ensure that whole
application is really mapped. Especially when the web application is very big and it is
impossible to manually ensure that every request type is really added to the site map.
Also executing spiders can cause side effects if it finds a link which executes unwanted
operation like a operation that deletes a user account or some other important information.
For this reason, it is important that spiders are used very carefully in product environment.
Also log out requests are annoying for spiders because if these requests are executed the
spider deletes its own session and the crawling is not completed perfectly. The traditional
spider can never be used silently because it makes hundreds or even thousands request.
For this reason, there is also passive spiders that parse links from the responses and add
these to the site map but do not requests these for additional site map entities. [27, p. 760]
Web application fuzzer is a tool for creating attack payloads to requests. It keeps inside
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multiple different built-in sets of attack payloads, where one or more multiple payload can
be select and use in requests to reveal vulnerabilities or use custom or built-in functions
to generate arbitrary payloads. These payloads can be based on malformed encoding,
character substitution, brute force, or data retrieved in a previous attack. [27, p. 762-763]
Vulnerability scanning executed in intercepting proxies can split into two categories; pas-
sive and active scanning. Passive scanning does not send any additional requests and for
this reason can be executed without trace. It monitors all requests and responses, which
pass through the proxy and identify potential vulnerabilities such as cleartext password
submission, cookie misconfiguration, and cross-domain referrer leakage. Active scanning
executes actual penetration testing. It cannot be executed without trace because vulne-
rabilities are detected by sending multiple crafted request with different standard attack
strings designed to trigger the signature of a vulnerability in the response. [27, p. 764]
Intercepting proxies in the market are made for different purposes and for different level
of knowledge about web application security testing. Tools, which are created for ad-
vanced penetration testers are usually more user-driven and need more manual work and
knowledge to get good results. These tools are called penetration testing tools, integrated
web application security testing suites or web hacking frameworks. Testers which does
not have so much knowledge cannot get good results with these testing suites because it
is required to know special details how vulnerabilities are revealed. For example, what
attack payloads should be used in requests and what results should be except in respon-
ses. However, with testing suites the application can be tested more precisely. It allows
to choose which requests are scanned first and how the scanning is performed. It also gi-
ves real time feedback that makes possible to find more advanced vulnerabilities if the
tester has enough experience to notice these vulnerabilities. Every attack request can be
sent manually or use repeater tools which sends multiple requests with different attack
payload and location combination. [27, p. 764]
Intercepting proxies usually have also features for automatic scanning. This includes pas-
sive scanner that work automatically in the background and active scanner that can be
executed manually for selected requests. Passive scanner analyze every request and res-
ponse, which go through the proxy while attack surface is introduced and report vulnera-
bilities immediately. Active scanner is needed to start manually. It can be executed for one
requests or multiple request simultaneously. It seeks common vulnerabilities by parsing
parameter locations from the request and then send the request again multiple times whi-
le blindly trying multiple different attack payloads one by one in every found parameter
location. Vulnerabilities are detected by analyzing the response for vulnerability signatu-
res that are something strange in the response that reveal that vulnerability exist or might
exist. [27, p. 764]
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If all or most phases in web application penetration testing is automated, these tools are
called standalone web application scanners. These tools crawl the application automa-
tically for example by using spider tools, execute passive and active scanners and then
produces a report describing each vulnerability it has discovered. These tools are good for
security testers, which does not have yet much experience. These test wide range of vul-
nerabilities and tester does not have to know special details how vulnerabilities occur and
can be revealed. Using standalone vulnerability scanner seems to be quite easy because
tester does not have to know anything about security testing but real functionality how
they work remain in the dark. Vulnerability scanners can never be perfect so even if the
report produced by standalone vulnerability scanner says that the application does not ha-
ve any vulnerabilities it does not say anything that it couldn’t have. All alarms reported
by scanner should also be reviewed because there can be false alarms. Experienced pe-
netration testers know the limitations of vulnerability scanners but they use these tools to
get easily a general overview about the application. It might prompt interesting occasions
which would need manual investigation. This is important information especially when
the application is very wide and is difficult to test entirely. [27, p. 764, 783–784]
4.4.2 Strengths, Limitations and Technical Challenges
Like said before standalone or automatic vulnerability scanners can never find every vul-
nerability in the web application but if the vulnerability causes clear signature in the res-
ponse it is possible to found. Vulnerability signature is programmatically identifiable evi-
dence in the response which tells that a vulnerability is successfully triggered. Scanners
are usually implemented to detect vulnerabilities at least from following categories:
• Reflected cross site scripting
• Some SQL injection vulnerabilities
• Some path traversal vulnerabilities
• Some command injection vulnerabilities
• Identify straightforward directory listing
• Cleartext password submission
The detection accuracy of the scanner depends how well attack strings and signature de-
tection were implemented and especially how the tested web application fits to the imple-
mentation of the scanner. The vulnerability can be left undetected even if an attack string
really triggers a vulnerability because the application responses different signature as the
scanner assumes. Also the attack string may be sanitized and for this reason do not trig-
ger a vulnerability even if a skilled attacker could discover a way to bypass the input
validation. [27, p. 773–776]
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Vulnerability scanners cannot detect several important categories of vulnerabilities because
these do not have detectable signature or cannot be exploit by using standard set of attack
strings. Some of these would be easily detected by any attacker with modest skills. These
are for example:
• Broken access control
• Vulnerabilities, which require that the meaning of a parameter in the applications is
understood.
• Logic flaws
• Weak password quality rules
• Session hijacking attacks
• Leakages of sensitive information
Some vulnerability scanners claim that they can detect also some of these vulnerabilities
but real detection accuracy depend a lot on the application what is tested. If the application
does not response or function like the scanner assumes these causes huge number false
positives and false negatives alarms. [27, p. 773–776]
Vulnerability scanners are designed and implemented by the experts of security testing,
but even if they would have skills to find manually every vulnerability in every web
application, it is impossible to create an automatic scanner, which would do that per-
fectly. Existing scanners are created to found vulnerabilities as many web applications as
possible but every web application is different and so that the scanner should find eve-
ry vulnerability these should understand the logic of the web application. This would be
possible only if the scanner is full-blown artificial intelligent or by adding human inter-
vention. For this reason, existing scanners work best against web sites and web applica-
tions which works expected ways and find only vulnerabilities, which does not require to
understand logic of the application. [27, p. 776–777]
Because the scanners do not understand the real meaning of parameters and the logic of
the web application it have to blindly test every parameter in every HTTP requests in the
site map by using all known attack strings. The scanner does not improvise if it notices
something strange because it only does what it is implemented. This causes that many
application specific vulnerabilities will be left undetected. For example, scanners are not
able to understand that being able to modify price of the product before form is sent
is a vulnerability whereas modifying some other parameter is not. Using vulnerability
scanners against product environment can be very dangerous also for this reason because
the scanner cannot understand what it is doing. It can reset user password, delete accounts
or corrupt all data by accident.[27, p. 776–779]
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Mapping the attack surface of a modern web application can be challenging. Web applica-
tions have usually content that are using the same core set of functionalities. These are
mapped unnecessarily multiple times to attack surface because if a vulnerability is found
in one content element it will be found also in other elements, which uses the same func-
tionality. The web application spider can also create new content while spidering the web
application. This causes more and more new elements to map that are usually also duplica-
tes. This can cause also that spidering newer ends. If the spidering is needed to manual-
ly stop, because it is in the loop, it causes that some content in the web application is
not mapped. Web application spider that actually executes client-side codes, fill forms
and press buttons would require lot of intelligent and understanding about logic of the
application so that they would work perfectly. This is usually impossible. They should for
example understand when invalid input is given so that it is possible to proceed forward
and execute important functionalities beyond that. As explained automatic spidering tools
for web sites or web applications are not perfect and they often left some parts of applica-
tion unmapped. Especially, when the web application is big and complicated or use lot
of client-side functionalities. It is also very difficult to notice when some part is missing
from the site map. Every content of the site map should be verified manually and it would
be as laborious as manually crawl the application. [27, p. 778–780]
Active scanner tests requests from the site map individually one by one. It selects one
request, use a crafted input in one parameter in the request and send the crafted request
for that potential vulnerability is revealed. This is continued until every test are executed in
every parameter in the request before the scanner switch to a next request. This means that
vulnerabilities in multi-step functionalities are not tested. Some vulnerabilities require
that a crafted input is submitted in one or more step and then it is observed the rest of
process for vulnerability signature. Then there are also vulnerabilities, which occur only
when sequence of steps is changed or when multiple crafted input parameter values is
used at the same time in one request. [27, p. 776–777]
Request isolation cause problems also in web applications, which hold data in both client
side and server side, and update its state to the server via asynchronous requests. The-
se requests are added to site map when the application is crawled and tested one by one
by active scanner. However, the application use these usually in a certain order or befo-
re some preconditions are achieved. The scanner should understand multistage request
processes to reveal all possible vulnerabilities. In other words, the scanner should be able
to change the state of the application so that it is in the desired state to handle a particu-
lar attack request. This problem can be understood by thinking different code paths that
are executed, when the application is in different states. Vulnerabilities exist in some code
path and the vulnerability is never revealed if the execution cannot reach that specific path
for example because some pre-condition has been verified. This logic is explained more
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Figure 4.2 Code paths of payment operation
specifically in the figure 4.2 that shows the possible code paths of order payment ope-
ration. In the first picture, the order is paid successfully while the application is crawled
manually. In the second picture, the same request is tried to execute again by the acti-
ve scanner but it does not succeed because that request still points to the same order as
crawled in the first picture. The execution won’t never go to the code path, where the vul-
nerability locates, even if the correct attack string is used in the correct parameter because
it is noticed in the code that the order is already paid and the execution goes to the other
code path. In the third picture it is explained the situation where that vulnerability can
be revealed. There a new order, which is not yet paid, is used in the request and a right
attack string is used to reveal the vulnerability. So that these situations can be tested it
always require human involvement that understand the requirements of the application,
knows how to configure the scanner appropriately and monitor how well the scanning is
performed. Explained situation can be common because usually in an application imple-
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mentation the pre-conditions have been verified at first and only, when these are fulfilled,
it is continued to the actual implementation that do modification operations. These ope-
rations are more important for safety because these more often touch a database. This
problem exists in requests, which does not return same results when these are executed
multiple times. [27, p. 780-781]
Any automated vulnerability scanner never provides absolute assurance that the applica-
tion does not contain anymore any vulnerabilities that scanner claims to be able to detect.
The effectiveness of using vulnerability scanner depends largely on the application you
are testing but generally it can be said that the scanners are capable to discover approxima-
tely half of these, where a standard signature exists. They cannot find the more subtle and
unusual cases with standard signature. Usually these deficiencies are related to uncom-
mon structure of web application or lack of understanding the functionality of the web
application. However, could it be possible to configure or extend vulnerability scanner to
work better with a specific web application if it is well known how the application works.
For example if the vulnerability scanner can itself establish different preconditions in the
system would it be possible to get better results and reach a level of reliability where the
results of the scanner can be really trusted. Also, could it be possible to detect more ad-
vanced application specific vulnerabilities automatically if it is possible to create tailored
scans that understand the logic of the application. These requires at least a good security
testing team with wide scale excellencies about security testing and programming. [27, p.
783–784]
4.5 Fully Automated Penetration Testing
Automatic testing tools are widely used for helping penetration testing because otherwise
testing is not effective [26]. These automate the worst time and money consuming ope-
rations but do not fully automate every task so that whole security testing round can be
executed without human intervention. The modern trend is that all testing should be au-
tomated but removing all human intervention may cause more disadvantages than advan-
tages if the automation is not made well enough. For example, if automatic testing causes
too much false positive alarms, correct alarms remain in the shadow of false alarms. This
causes also that no one wants or have time to check and analyze the results to find the cor-
rect issues. If this continues for a long time, step by step the results of automatic testing
system are not trusted anymore and it becomes useless. Before the security testing can
fully automated it should be sure that the quality of the security testing is good enough.
Selected system or tool can really find vulnerabilities automatically and there isn’t false
alarms or the amount these is very low.
If some existing penetration testing tool is wanted to use as base for fully automated
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security testing system the tool should have features to automate every three phases in the
penetration testing:
1. There should be way to automatically retrieve and map the attack surface and teach
it to the selected penetration testing tool. In some cases, it is enough that the content
of previous testing round can be maintain and reuse for next testing round. This can
be used if the application interface does not change much and the changes is easy to
add but usually security testing is more important when new items is added to the
interface. It would be good if the attack surface would stay up-to-date automatically.
2. There should be way to automatically start the scanners after the first phase is done.
Scanner should work as perfect as possible so that it would report only actual issues.
3. There should be way to programmatically go through all find issues to make a
report and analyze these so that potential false alarms can be discarded. The best
case would be that there won’t be any false alarms and all false alarms would be
fixed by improving scans.
So that the these can be achieved, the team who maintains the system and analyze results
is needed to be excellent in both security testing and software engineering so that they
can find the reasons for false alarms and fix these to the automatic system for that the
system can provide better results next time. Systems cannot also automatically find new
vulnerability types without that an existing test is reviewed and added to the system or a
new test is implemented to the system.
Automated security testing would be important nowadays in continues integration where
SDLC (Software Development Life Cycle) is very short and a new version is published
every month or even every week. By using manual penetration testing it is not possible to
test the security of every published version well enough at least when the application is
really large.
4.6 OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Project
OWASP (The Open Web Application Security Project) is a not-for-profit charitable orga-
nization, which goal is to add visibility about web application security and improve the
safety and security of the softwares in the world. OWASP has multiple projects which
develop security tools, produce documents about security and provide place for forums
that all are free and open to everyone interested in improving application security. Core
values of OWASP are to be honest, truthful, transparent and vendor neutral, encourage
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to innovate solutions to software security challenges and encourage anyone around the
world participate in the OWASP community. [18][23]
Multiple project under OWASP brand are related to developing security software [19].
One of developed software is OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy), which is a DAST tool
working as intercepting HTTP proxy. ZAP describes itself as integrated penetration tes-
ting tool, which is easy to use when finding vulnerabilities in web applications. Like all
projects under OWASP brand ZAP is open source project and it is completely free without
that user needs paid for a better pro version. Development of OWASP is started based on
source code of Paros Proxy that had been popular intercepting proxy in early 2000 but
its development was ended around 2006 [24]. OWASP ZAP has become popular since its
first version was released in 2010. It has very active community and forums for users and
developers and it is developed actively. [21][22]
Figure 4.3 UI of OWASP ZAP
OWASP ZAP is helpful tool for all penetration testers regardless of their experience.
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It can be used for automated vulnerability scanning without actual understanding about
vulnerabilities but it has also multiple helpful tools for manual security testing. All in
all, OWASP ZAP has multiple features that are common for all intercepting proxies but
it has also other features. Some of these features are created as add-ons but in OWASP
ZAP it means the same as a built-in feature. Next it is listed and explained some of most
important features of OWASP ZAP:
• Intercepting HTTP proxy that is started simultaneously with OWASP ZAP to the
default port that is 8080 or freely selected custom port. It allows user to see all
requests and responses, which have gone through the proxy and modify these on
the fly in set break points. [21]
• History pane where is seen all requests and their responses that have gone through
the proxy. Pane 2 in figure 4.3. [21]
• Site Map that describe the structure of a web application in tree view mode. Pane
1 in figure 4.3. [21]
• Spider that work like a traditional web site spider. It finds additional URLs from
links in HTML code. Also some known pages and files, which are added to web
application for revealing the structure of the site, were read. For example Robots.txt.
[21]
• AJAX Spider that is a web application spider. It uses web UI test automation tool
Selenium to open inside the browser so that all client-side scripts are executed and
then click and fill all UI elements on the page so that client sided functionalities of
the web application are executed. [21]
• Possibility to manually resend a request with any change wanted to test. [21]
• Fuzzer is a tool for submitting lots of requests with different attack payloads to a
target. Payloads can be based built-in sets, custom scripts or payload generators.
The functionality of this tools is based from the OWASP JBroFuzz project and
includes files from the fuzzdb project. [21]
• Passive Scanner executes passive scans for all requests and responses have gone
through the proxy or only messages which are in the selected scope. It is performed
in a background for that it does not slow down the exploration of an application.
[21]
• Active Scanner is needed to start manually. It can be performed one by one for
every message or recursively for all message under specific node selected in the site
map. [21]
Functionality of OWASP ZAP can be expand by installing free extensions from Mar-
ketplace. Some extensions are already installed in default installation and some previous-
ly mentioned features was implemented as extension for example AJAX spider. All scans
for Passive Scanner and Active Scanner are also implemented as Extensions. By default,
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release scan sets for Passive and Active Scanner are installed. These contains scanner ru-
les, which are verified to be high quality. Additional of this, there is possible to install
beta or alpha quality scanner rules. Beta quality indicates that these scanner rules has rea-
sonable quality but are not yet ready or need further testing. Alpha quality indicates that
these scanner rules are in an early stage of development. Beta and alpha quality scanner
rules can also find new vulnerabilities but there are no absolute certainty because these
are still in progress. [21]
OWASP ZAP can be used also as standalone or fully automated vulnerability scanner. It
has very comprehensive REST API and the same information is used also to create APIs
for Java, Python, PHP, NodeJS and .NET languages. The API seems to have methods for
all operations that are possible manually so all operations, which are necessary to fully
automate the standalone vulnerability scanner, are possible. [21]
4.6.1 Adding Additional Functionalities to OWASP ZAP
OWASP ZAP has very good extensibility support that is implemented by creating add-
on support. These add-ons have full access to all ZAP internal functionalities and are for
this reason powerful tool for creating new features and modifying existing functionalities.
All new features of OWASP ZAP like AJAX Spider are already created as extension that
should explains how comprehensive the extension support really is. Add-ons are created
by Java language. Existing add-ons can be upload from Add-on Marketplace that is built-
in feature inside OWASP ZAP and many basic extensions are installed by default if the
ZAP is installed by using the default installation package. [21]
One installed extension package can have multiple extension items that are loaded when
the extension is installed or when ZAP is restarted. Extensions items are listed in zapad-
don.xml file that should be locate in the root folder of the extension package. There are
three different type for extension items:
• Extension
• Active Scanner Rule
• Passive Scanner Rule
Extension items are executed when application is started. These items are for new featu-
re implementations, API additions and UI modifications. For example, for new buttons,
menu items and dialogs that are used to operate the new feature. It is also possible to re-
gister listeners for modifying existing functionality to different situation. For example, it
is possible to create listeners to check and modify every HTML-request which is received
before it is sent to ZAP and again just before ZAP send it forward to a web application. All
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locations, where a request or a response can be check, modified or own implementation
can be added, are seen in figure 4.4. [21]
Figure 4.4 Locations of event handlers which can be used to check and modify requests and
responses or add additional features when the execution is reached to this situation.
Event handlers are registered by inheriting a class from a base class (i.e. HttpSenderLis-
tener), implementing its abstract methods and then register the new object from that class
by using the correct registration methods. Methods onHttpRequestSend and onHttpRes-
ponseReceive in ProxyListener base class can be used to prevent a request or a response
to be sent forward, clean requests from parameters, which are not wanted seen in the si-
te map or add a note that is built-in feature of ZAP for sending additional information
with a request to other components in ZAP like between these listeners. Similar methods
in HttpSenderListener are called just before a request is sent to a web application and
just after a response is received from the web application This is the last gate before the
web application and is good place to make last modifications to requests and responses.
Methods beforeScan and afterScan in ScannerHook can be used to implement similar
functionalities as with methods in HttpSenderListener but these are executed only while
the active scanner is executed. These messages are also gone through HttpSender so also
all modifications implemented HttpSenderListnerers are executed. The developer of the
extension needs to be careful to that similar operations are not executed twice by accident.
[21]
Active Scanner Rule and Passive Scanner Rule extension items are used to define new
scans to the scanners. It is possible to create as good scan as exiting scans because all
existing scanner rules are also created as extension and use same tools. Custom scanner
rule are created by implementing a class and inheriting it from a correct base class. A pas-
sive scanner rule is created by inheriting the class from PluginPassiveScanner and imple-
menting methods scanHttpRequestSend(HttpMessage msg, int id) that is called for every
request and scanHttpResponseReceive(HttpMessage msg, int id, Source source) that is
called for every response. Developer can create two different types of active scanner rule.
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A rule, which is executed for all requests, is created by inheriting a class from Abstrac-
tAppPlugin and implementing scan() method and a rule, which is executed for all para-
meters in the requests, is created by inheriting a class from AbstractAppParamPlugin and
implementing scan(HttpMessage msg, String param, String value) method. Parameters,
which are tested in this rule and in all existing rules, are selected from UI before active
scanner is started. [16] [17]
Active scanner rules are intended to make requests to the tested web application. A copy
of the current HTTP message is retriever by using getNewMsg() method. This returns
a copy of the original request from the site map that is currently tested. This request
can be modified in all possible ways before these are sent to the tested web application
by using command sendAndReceive(...). After the response is received it can be analyzed
and possible findings can be inform by using bingo(...) method. The copied HTTP request
cannot be reused so if the scan requires to make multiple requests getNewMsg() is needed
to call for each request. [17]
The easiest way to make small modification to OWASP ZAP is use scripting possibilities
added in Script Console extension. This adds scripting support with JSR 223 scripting
languages. For example JavaScript. Then there is also two other extension, which add
scripting support also with Python and Ruby. [21]
This scripting console contains 8 different script types. These scripts allows developers
to make additions and modifications to existing functionalities like with extensions but in
limited areas. [21]
Active Rules With active rules script a new active scans by using scripting lan-
guages can be created similarly as with the extensions. [21]
Authentication If active scanner or spider has sent logout request, relogin can be
automatized with authentication script. For that this is done in cor-
rect time, it is needed to define a string or regular expression (Re-
gex) to the setting which tells that the user is not logged in. This
authentication script is important because testing fails if request do
not have same possibility to provide similar results as when these
are mapped. Attack strings used in active scan usually cause dif-
ferent a response message but if the user has been logged out and
some vulnerabilities can be left unrevealed. [21]
HTTP Sender HTTP Sender script allows to do similar functionality changes as
with HttpSenderListener implemented in a ZAP extension. [21]
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Passive Rules Passive rules allows to create custom passive scan by using scripting
languages similarly as with an extension. [21]
Proxy Proxy script allows allows to create similar functionality changes
as with ProxyListener implemented in a ZAP extension. [21]
Script Input Vector Script Input Vectors are used to define the places in a HTTP request
what ZAP should attack. [21]
Stand Alone Stand Alone scripts are scripts that can be executed only manually.
[21]
Targeted Targeted scripts are similar as Stand Alone scripts but these are tar-
geted to the specific URLs. [21]
It is important to notice also that additional of these extension possibilities the core of
OWASP ZAP can be also modified because it is open source application. Of course, this
should never be the first act but if the needed changes can be made easily and change can-
not be done by using extension possibilities it is worth of considering. After the changes
are made and these are useful for others
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5. SECURITY TESTING OF M-FILES WEB
Security testing is important part in software development. Even if security testing can be
bought from third party companies, which are professionals in their field, it is necessary
that every company that develops software performs also own security testing. That way
companies ensures that third party security testing do their work properly. Internal security
testing team can execute their testing more freely because more confidential information
can be given for them because information leaks does not have to be considered. This
additional information can improve testing results and testing coverage. At the same time
this will tests also the effectiveness of the purchased service.
5.1 M-Files Product
M-Files is a product especially for Microsoft Windows developed by Finnish software
company M-Files. M-Files itself calls their product as EIM (Enterprise Information Ma-
nagement) system because M-Files wants to stand out from old ECM (Enterprise Content
Management) system and tell that all information is equally important, needs control and
a system to manage it. Not just documents. In other words, M-Files develops similarly
named product for corporations to handle all their information. This information includes
in addition to documents all meta data related to the document but also all information
related to i.e. customers, products, projects, employees and other information that usually
do not have any specific document. In M-Files, document is just one object type among
the other like customers or projects. [13]
The place where the information is in M-Files is called a vault that all Microsoft Windows
users are seen as M-Files (M:) drive on their local computer. Physically the information is
located on M-Files Server application that is running on external server and client applica-
tions are connected to this server over the local or external Internet. One M-Files server
can manage multiple vaults simultaneously.
Even if M-Files drive is seen in the same way as other drives in Windows its differ a lot
from folder-based systems like File Explore in Windows. To M-Files, it is more impor-
tant what the document is instead of where it is stored so M-Files has rejected hierarchical
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folder based system, where it was necessary to know specific path to find or store a docu-
ment. In M-Files, the specific document can be categorize based on its meta data. For
example, a specification document, which is related to a specific customer and project,
can be found by searching all specification documents which are related to this specific
project and customer. In folder-based system there can be many good places to save or
seek this document. For example, good places are
D:/Customers/CustomerABC/SpecificationDocuments
or
D:/SpecificationDocuments/ProjectXYZ
and if the system has both folder structures it is difficult to know, which structure should be
used in certain situation. Choosing incorrectly can lead to situations where other emplo-
yees cannot be sure where the correct document can be found or save their own version
from the document in the other path and then no one can be sure, where the newest docu-
ment locates. Main problem there is that this is not automatic and it needs always common
agreements that each must respect. In M-Files, correct document version can be found if
it has enough meta data. M-Files has also a feature which emulates folder structure cal-
led views so the documents can be found also without using search. At underneath, these
views are like saved meta data based searches where can be defined different meta data ba-
sed grouping rules that emulates sub folders. Outward a view looks like a folder structure
and it is possible to create views that looks like the folder structures presented in examples
above. Because views are based on meta data searches the same document can be found
in two places in same time and if the modification is made in one place same modifica-
tions are visible immediately in the other place. This difference is explained in figures 5.1
and 5.2. The first figure shows how difficult it can be to find the correct document from
folder structure and the second figure explains how in M-Files this is impossible because
the same object is found from various paths. [11][13]
M-Files has also simple built in version control that has only four commands: check out,
check in, undo check out and roll back. Version control works so that before document
or some other file in another object type is wanted to modify user needs to check out
for modification. After that moment other users cannot modify the same document or see
modifications which the user, who checked out the document, has made. Document is
opened always inside M-Files so users never have local copies that could confuse. After
the user is ready he checksthe document in and other users can see the modifications and
made own modifications. If it is wanted to return to back to the version where modification
was started user can undo check out the document and if it is wanted to return back to even
older version user can use roll back option. These features force to make modifications so
that it is always known, which is the newest version of the information. [11][13]
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Figure 5.1 The document can have multiple potential locations in folder based document mana-
gement system
Every documents and information object saved in M-Files have individual permissions
that restrict how users can see and use the information. Permissions is split to four easily
understandable access right that are read, edit, delete and change permissions that every
can be explicitly allow or deny. There is many ways how to configure automatic adaptive
permissions and if the vault is configured well user itself does not have to care about
permissions. For example, permissions can be meta data driven so that if a document
relates to a project it gets automatically permissions from metadata of the project. It gives
all access rights except change permission access right to team member, which working
on the project, project leader gets all permissions including change permission access
right and other employees can only see the document. [11]
M-Files is not focused to any specific business area. Out of the box M-files have only ba-
sic features presented above and only couple object types. However, M-Files has compre-
hensive modification possibilities. The aim of M-Files is to adapt to workflows and prac-
tices of a corporation and does not require that the corporation should adapt practices that
M-Files propose. For this reason, the large part of the deployment of M-Files is set up
and customizing the vault like defining used meta data structure elements, workflows and
tailor-made vault extensions. Meta data structure of the vault can be modified by adding
and defining following meta data elements:
Object Type Object type is main element to separate differently typed objects.
By default, in a new vault there is only two object types: Docu-
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Figure 5.2 M-Files can have multiple views that emulates different folder structures and the same
document is accessible via multiple paths.
ment and Assignment. Additional object types can be created free-
ly. Good example for object types are Project, Customer, Product or
Employee.
Class Every object in the vault belongs to some class. Class is object type
specific and contains information about which properties need to
be defined to object meta data when object is created.Property can
be mandatory or non-mandatory. For example, project object type
can have classes Internal Project and Customer Project. Customer
project have for example properties Name, Customer, Responsible
Person, Starting Date and End Date.
Value List Value list is a list of string value items. Value list items is like ob-
jects but these does not have additional meta data. Just the name.
For example, countries or languages are good examples for value
list.
Property Definition Property definition defines a property which is used in a class or
added additionally to a metadata of an object. Property definition
has a data type which can be text, multi-line text, Integer, a double-
precision floating point, date, time, boolean, lookup or multi-line
lookup. Lookup properties are properties which add relation to a
value list item or to an object. For example, responsible person pro-
perty can be lookup property which contain values of Employee
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objects.
Workflow Every object in M-Files can have to a workflow, which is sequence
of states, where the document belongs during its lifetime. Various
workflows can be freely configured and set as a default or manda-
tory workflow for objects which belong to a specific class. Various
operations can be made to the object while its state is changed. For
example, it can be converted to PDF or change permission.
User group Users created in M-Files or another user groups can be grouped to
bigger user groups which then can be used in access control lists or
in metadata of object.
Operations in M-Files can be divided in to two groups. These are client operations and
administration operations. Client operations are operations that a user can do without any
administrator privileges such as viewing and modifying object meta data and possible de-
lete or delete objects. Client operations for an object or metadata structure elements can
be restricted defining permissions for this specific object. Permissions of metadata struc-
ture element can be changed so that some users or user groups cannot see that metadata
element or cannot modify for example a property. Administrator operations are opera-
tions which always need some specific privileges before a user is able to execute these.
For example, undeleting deleted items, modifying metadata structure are administrator
operations. [11]
5.1.1 Connecting to M-Files Vault
Before any client or server operations can be executed in the vault the user needs a login
account. The user can have M-Files specific login account but also windows account can
be mapped to M-Files.
Users in M-Files can login to the vault by using different platforms. At the moment M-
Files has client applications for Microsoft Windows, web browser, Android and IOS that
are only for client operations. Additional of this there is M-Files Admin for Windows
that is used for admin operations. All these application and how these communicate with
M-Files Server is seen in the figure 5.3. Desktop client for Windows, M-Files Admin
and M-Files API uses RPC (Remote Procedure Call) over TCP protocol. M-Files API is
COM interface that contains methods for all client and admin operations that are possible
also manually. It has been used for creating M-Files Web Service (MFWS), which is
REST like HTTP API and is the main target in this master thesis, which security testing
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Figure 5.3 Different M-Files clients uses different technologies and protocols to access the vault
in M-Files server. M-Files Desktop, M-Files Admin and M-Files API uses RPC over TCP. Mobile
application and M-Files Web uses M-Files Web Service which is implemented by using M-Files
COM API.
is improved. MFWS is used for creating M-Files Web client for all popular web browsers
and mobile applications for Android and IOS. M-Files Web Service like also M-Files API
are public interfaces and has public documentations so these are used also for creating
third party applications. MFWS is not enabled by default but is configured and enabled
simultaneously when M-Files Web is configured for the M-Files server. [9] [11]
M-Files Web Service (MFWS)
M-Files Web Service is a HTTP API for executing client operations to the vault. It descri-
be itself as “REST like” interface and it resembles a lot REST interface but does not fol-
low every detail of REST architecture style. For example, MFWS uses URIs to identify
resources and HTTP methods almost correctly to utilize uniform interface but HATEOAS
is not used to deliver relationships between resources and communication is not always
stateless because some requests expects that the vault is in the specific state before they
succeed. For example, some requests returns error if the object in M-Files is not checked
out before the request is executed.[12]
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Because M-Files Web and M-Files Mobile applications use this interface it is not possible
to use M-Files Web or M-Files mobile applications without that this interface is enabled
and available for everyone. Of course M-Files credentials are needed before it is possible
to access to information in the vault but the interface is still visible and anyone can try
access and diagnose its security.[12]
MFWS has public documentation that means it cannot be sure how many third-party
applications use it. This makes harder to modify the service because it has not been wan-
ted to break third-party applications. For this reason MFWS contains methods, which are
deprecated and are not used anymore either in M-Files Web or M-Files mobile applica-
tions. The documentation is not also updated for a while so it has deficiencies. MFWS
has multiple methods, which are used in both M-Files Web and M-Files Mobile, but it
has also methods that are used only in one of the application because M-Files Web and
M-Files Mobile applications support differing features. [11][12]
Like in REST API M-Files Web Service consist of resources and these resources can be
accessed via resource hierarchy. There are five big hierarchies where most of resources
belongs. These are objects hierarchy, views hierarchy, vault structure hierarchy, server
hierarchy and session hierarchy. Resources in body are always presented as JSON and
there isn’t support for XML. [12]
For example a new file can be added to a M-Files object, which is checked out, by using
command
POST /objects/<object type id>/<object id>/<version>/files,
properties of an object can retrieved with command
GET /objects/<object type id>/<object id>/<version>/properties
and an object can be checked out with command
GET /objects/<object type id>/<object id>/checkout.
The last command does not follow REST architecture quite well because this change the
state of the object by using GET method that should be idempotent and should not change
anything on the server. Additional of this MFWS contains multiple method, which are
allowed only for objects, which are checked out. Like the first command.
Requests to MFWS can be authenticated by using three different methods. Credentials can
be passed in HTTP header of each request, use cookie-based session or use authentication
tokens. Passing the username and the password in the HTTP header is the easiest way but
it is secure only when using secure HTTPS connection because credentials are passed as
plain text in each request. Cookie-based authentication is most useful in browser environ-
ments where the browser can set and store cookies automatically. Authentication tokens
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are best solution when browser is not used because this encrypt the credentials by using
asymmetric encryption and does not have same insecurity problems as when credentials
are passed in HTTP header as plain text. [12]
5.1.2 M-Files Extensibility
As told previously M-Files has very comprehensive extensibility support. Most of custo-
mizations are possible to implement by using built-in features but more advanced custo-
mizations is needed to implement by using vault applications or scripting possibilities in
various situations. The UI of Windows and web clients can be extended by using UI Ex-
tensibility framework that can be used to create new commands, buttons, dashboards and
new functionalities to UI. All in all features of M-Files can split to three groups:
1. Features, which exist in every implemented system i.e. version control, file opera-
tions, metadata, permissions and authentication.
2. Features, which providers changing and reformation possibilities by changing me-
tadata structure of the vault. For example, by creating and configuring new Object
Types, Classes, Properties and Workflows. All reformation possibilities of these
features can be somehow known beforehand even if these allows multiple different
combination.
3. Features, which allows to modify and extend basic functionalities arbitrary ways.
For example, by implementing vault applications, using scripting support or using
UI Extensibility framework. These modifications cannot be predict so these can
cause strange incidents like additional issues and vulnerabilities that are difficult to
prevent.
A vault application is a dll (Dynamic-link library) created by using C#. Methods in this
dll are called by using VBScript in event handlers that are triggered in various situations.
There are over 70 different event handlers in M-Files that can be implement. For example,
it is possible to make own modifications to the vault after a new object is created or af-
ter an existing object is modified or check object properties before the changes are saved.
Additional of these it is possible to implement Vault Extension Methods. These are ma-
nually triggered methods that are implemented by using VBScript but the execution can
be delegated to a vault application similarly as with event handlers. These can be called
by using M-Files API or MFWS so vault execution methods can be used to implement
new methods to M-Files API and MFWS. It is easy way to execute complex operations
via API, which are not related to any specific event in the vault. Vault Extension Met-
hod has a name and can have one string input parameter and can produce string output.
[9][10][11][12]
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5.2 Security Risks in M-Files Products
M-Files offer secure place for most important and in the same time also the most confiden-
tial information of a corporation. It is very important that the security of M-Files product
is in good shape. If M-Files product causes information leak this causes big problems to a
corporation, which confidential information is leaked, but also this causes as big problems
to M-Files because customers lose their faith for M-Files and switch to another product.
For this reason, even one negative case can cause permanent effect to deals.
M-Files is affected by many security risks. Some of these are very general but some are
related to the specific client platform. M-Files has for example following security risks:
• Someone has an opportunity to get access to information in M-Files vault without
any credentials.
• Someone who has credentials to M-Files vault has opportunity to access informa-
tion, which should be permitted for his/her.
• It is possible to break the system with or without credentials.
• It is possible to take the system under control.
• Privacy of users can be compromised.
• Vault application or UI Extension application has made a hole, which endangers the
entire system.
• M-Files Web client, M-Files Web Service or some other client software of M-Files
has a vulnerability, which endangers the user, M-Files Server or confidential infor-
mation in the vault.
M-Files Web and Web service are most vulnerable parts in M-Files because it is easy and
familiar for attackers to start seeking vulnerabilities. Browser and HTTP communication
specific vulnerabilities are investigated a lot and these have a lot known vulnerabilities.
There is also a lot of existing user-friendly and free tools to intercept and investigate
HTTP request and responses. Communication between Windows desktop client and M-
Files Server has been implemented by using self-made RPC protocol. This traffic is more
difficult to investigate because there are not any existing tools and there are not existing
vulnerabilities. For these reason it can be considered more secure even if it can contain
vulnerabilities.
Vault applications and UI Ext applications can create additional vulnerabilities and secu-
rity risks that are difficult to prevent by M-Files itself. This is due to chosen approach that
does not prevent any extensibility functionalities from vault applications. It is not wanted
to exclude any operations in vault applications for that it may pose a risk because this re-
duce extensibility possibilities. For this reason, vault applications have privileges that is
not always necessary. Vault applications and UI Ext applications can be made so that the-
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se does create additional vulnerabilities but this is not forced any way. It is chosen that it
is responsibility of the developer of vault application that it does not contain any security
holes.
Invalidly configured permissions cause also security risks because permissions of M-Files
object can be based different configurations and it is not easy task to configure them cor-
rectly. It can be for example based on related objects metadata, object class or manually
selected users and user groups. When these are configured invalidly some users can acci-
dentally see information, which should be available only for small group only because
object permission has an invalid rule that allows users selected in related object’s meta-
data. M-Files is also very difficult to prevent these and it is responsibility of the vault
administrator to configure permissions correctly. Responsibility of M-Files is to ensure
that the permissions works as has been said.
5.3 Security Testing in Software Company Compared to Purc-
hased Service
When security testing is purchased as service from third party company that is specialized
to penetration testing both parties sign NDA (Non-Disclosure Agreement) and so called
"Permission to hack"agreement. It is also defined following details:
• What part of the organization or what software should be tested.
• When the penetration testing is started and when it should be ended.
• Methodology that should be used when a penetration testing is executed.
• What is goals of a penetration testing.
• The allowed and disallowed penetration testing techniques. For example, does DoS
testing allowed.
• Liabilities and responsibilities if something breaks because penetration testing ac-
tivities.
Definitions and restrictions are necessary because usually the organization who has purc-
hased the service has made the test environment and locates the internal network of the
organization or the penetration testing is conducted against a product environment. [26]
These agreements are unnecessary if the security testing is conducted by the software
company’s own security testing team. They have already sign NDA when they have be-
gan in the company and they have also more knowledge about the software going to test
so they usually know how to build the testing environment or at least are allowed to ma-
nage the environment itself because the whole testing is performed inside the company’s
internal network. The testing is seldom carried out against any production environment.
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That way testers are more freely to test different situation and do have to worry about if
the environment is not usable after penetration tests.
The security testing differs also how much information is given for the testing team. If
security testing is bought from a third-party company, all possible information is not
always wanted to give. Some information is considered too confidential to be given to
third party even if this information could be important revealing vulnerabilities and NDA
agreements are signed. There is two different school of thoughts. Some wants that penet-
ration tester and ethical hackers have just that information what a malicious hacker would
have and then there is a group who things that all possible information should be given
to penetration testers so that they would have the best chances to find all vulnerabilities.
First way of thinking tests how likely a hacker can break in the system and how ell the
detection systems detect cyber-attacks. Second way of thinking give a change to find as
much vulnerabilities as possible. The security testing performed inside software company
resembles always more the second method. [2]
The information, which is not usually given to third party penetration testers, are non-
public documentations, source codes and technical details about the software. However,
these are information, which internal penetration testers can see. Technical details how
the applications is implemented helps to create more suitable attacks to find technology
specific vulnerabilities. Source code is important because vulnerabilities can be found di-
rectly from the code but it can be used also to analyze how the application really works.
Non-public documentation can contain details and features, which are hidden from public
documentation. There are many reasons why some features are hidden from publicity.
The feature can be deprecated but it is still used by some important customers and for
this reason this feature cannot be totally removed. Of course, if the feature is not publicly
documented it is not very likely that attacker can found this information but if undocu-
mented, deprecated or otherwise hidden feature has vulnerabilities it is still security issue.
Information about deprecated features can be seek for example by examining old public
documentations.
5.4 Problems with vulnerability scanners while testing M-
Files Web
As explained previously, the performance of a vulnerability scanner is highly related to
how well the scanner is implemented tp understand the structure and functionality of the
tested web application. Most scanners try to work best with general web applications. If
structure or functionality are far from what the tool except the test results can be very bad.
This is more probable if the tested application is very complex or it is implemented by
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using advanced technologies. Compatibility of M-Files Web with vulnerability scanners
was investigated by using above-mentioned OWASP ZAP. It wasn’t focused to investigate
how many different vulnerabilities OWASP ZAP can find from M-Files Web Service but
identifying the problems and technical challenges, which are common for all vulnerabi-
lity scanners, when the scanner is used for scanning M-Files Web Service. These causes
deficiencies to overall quality of security testing and if these are not known these causes
either illusion that the application is safe or a feeling that the scanner only produce false
alarms. The problems that were common for vulnerability scanners and were encountered
when OWASP ZAP was used to test the security M-Files Web Service are explained in
next chapters..
Problems when Crawling MFWS
Different built in crawling methods of ZAP were tested and it was discovered that best
solutions at this moment was still obtained to crawl M-Files Web Service manually th-
rough M-Files Web like before. It was only way to introduce every request type used in
M-Files Web. Traditional spider that try to find additional links from source code didn’t
work at all because the main page of M-Files Web does not contain any links to anot-
her pages. Different pages are opened by uploading different content to the same page
by using methods in MFWS that were executed by using JavaScript. The most important
would be introduce every request type in MFWS but automatic spider does have enough
information to crawl these by using responses of MFWS because the resources of MFWS
does not contain information about sub resources like in the REST specification told they
should have.
Ajax spider of OWASP ZAP that really push every button and link in the web page and
executes JavaScript has theoretical possibility to crawl every corner of M-Files Web but
the procedure how the spider clicks different buttons and links is so random and because
clicking possibilities in M-Files Web is so huge that time which this is going to take is
too long. It never ends and even if the execution was ended by force after couple hours
the spider was crawled only basic functionalities and these were crawled multiple times
because same operations can be made for all objects in M-Files. The spider also crea-
tes new content to M-Files that makes even more difficult that spider might find mode
complex features in M-Files Web. Some features need exact series of operations and it is
reasonable to wait that AJAX spider finds them by accident.
Either using manual crawling through M-Files Web is not the best possible solution
because it never introduces every possible methods of MFWS. It contains every time
human error and some parts can be left taught by accident. Using the same session from
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a previous testing round where requests are already introduced as well as possible is not
good solution either because this does not take in to account new or changed requests and
most often new vulnerabilities are found in these requests. Even if the manual teaching
would be perfect every time for example by using some automatic UI testing tool, which
can define to programmatically click wanted buttons in M-Files Web in specific order and
emulating to usage which touch every feature, only request used in M-Files Web can be
introduced. This approach misses all requests which is used only in M-Files mobile clients
and requests which is not used in any application created by M-Files. Some not used met-
hods have been marked also as deprecated. The best way to minimize vulnerabilities from
these methods would be remove these from the interface but this cannot be done because
is in not known if these are used in some third-party applications. These missing requests
are still important because the interface is public and available for everyone after M-Files
Web is configured.
Manual crawling cause also that requests, which executes the same method in MFWS,
are added to site map unnecessary multiple times. This happen because some methods of
MFWS are very commonly used in M-Files Web. These requests manage different object
so they have different URL but OWASP ZAP does not understand that these are used as
parameters in the same method and add these to site map. This does not cause any harm to
testing coverage but extends testing time noticeably because these are unnecessary tested
separately.
Scanning XSS-Vulnerabilities Cause Lot of False Alarms
The scan in OWASP ZAP that checks XSS-vulnerabilities, cause lot of false alarms and
never finds real XSS-vulnerabilities from M-Files Web. OWASP ZAP tests requests indi-
vidually and assume that every response would be a web page that is shown and executed
in a browser. If OWASP ZAP notices that the response has javascript, which is not esca-
ped, it alarms about XSS vulnerability.
MFWS sends responses without escaping and leaves it to the developer’s responsibility
that uses the service to escape the responses before these are shown in the browser. In
M-Files, Web escaping is implemented this way just before showing. XSS-vulnerabilities
are not revealed because it is not tested how MFWS responses are shown in the website.
This problem is explained in figure 5.4. XSS vulnerabilities are quite impossible to test
by using OWASP ZAP so this vulnerability should be covered by using some other tool.
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Figure 5.4 Real XSS vulnerabilities are not revealed because OWASP ZAP or other vulnerability
scanners does not test how the responses are escaped in the website.
Plenty Unnecessary Attack Strings Was Tested
OWASP ZAP creates lot of unnecessary test executions because with default settings it
assumes that web site can use all possible technologies and try to attack by technology
specific attack vectors. For example, why it is necessary to test MySQL specific SQL
injection attacks if it is known that MySQL cannot be used with M-Files Product. This is
not a obligatory problem to fix because this cause only slowness in the test execution but
if it is necessary to speed up the executions this is good and easy way to start.
The State of the Vault Does Not Stay Stable when Active Scanner Is Executed
As explained before, the vulnerability scanners have problems to understand multistage
processes of today’s web applications. These problems were encountered also, when M-
Files Web was tested and it causes that many requests were not tested as carefully as
other. When the scanner scans vulnerabilities by setting attack strings one by one in every
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parameter value in the request, it send hundreds almost similar requests. If the request
modifies an object in the vault so that the same request responses differently next time it
is not known anymore that every possible vulnerability is revealed. For example, if the
request, which deletes an object, is tested the object is already deleted after the request
is introduced to OWASP ZAP. The same request works differently after that because the
object does not exist anymore. This causes doubt about testing coverage because it is
possible that the method in M-Files Web Service is implemented so that at first it tests
if the object exist and only after that tries to delete it. If the object does not exist ever
it will be tested only the part that verifies that the object exist. If the vulnerability exists
after that it will be left uncovered. Also situations where the request succeed but it does
not do anything because requested operation is already done cause doubts because also
then it cannot be sure that the execution goes as deep in the code path as when something
is really done. These kind of problems are detected in M-Files Web at least in following
situations:
• A document, which is transformed from single-file document to multi-file docu-
ment, causes an error when the request tries to transform a document which already
is a multi-file document. Similar problem exists when a document is tried to trans-
form to single-file document.
• Object undeletion can be done successfully only for document which is deleted.
Otherwise it causes error.
• An object can be marked as a favorite only once. The request succeeds but causes
doubts.
• An object can be removed only once from the favorites. The request succeeds also
but causes doubts.
• Multiple requests require either that the object is checked out or checked in before
the request can be execute successfully. Biggest problems are caused by requests
which check in or check out the object because these cause failures if the object is
already in the requested state.
• Object cannot be moved to a next state in a workflow if it is already on that state.
A large part of methods in M-Files Web Service can be tested without problems. Only
methods, which modify the content of the vault cause problems. Even if this problem is
found only in fraction of tested methods these contain operations, which are most dange-
rous if these have vulnerabilities. So that this can be fixed there should be some procedure
to return the object to the old state so that the next request has same change to succeed as
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previous one or make a copy of a suitable object and prepare it for testing and change the
request so that it points to the new object.
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6. IMPROVING COVERAGE OF M-FILES WEB
SECURITY TESTING
Two components were implemented in this master thesis. They both improve testing cove-
rage and tries to patch two found problems when security of M-Files Web Service is tested
by using a DAST tool. The first it was created a tool for bypass the crawling problems.
The tool learns everything about usage of M-Files Web Service from source code and use
this information to teach that to a DAST tool. The second component is a PoC (Proof of
Context) extension to OWASP ZAP that uses the same information to maintain the state
of the vault and improve testing coverage further while scanning is on-going.
6.1 Background to the Chosen Solution
When teaching phase of DAST tool was managed manually it caused several problems
that was wanted to overtake. It caused that all methods in MFWS had not been introduced
to DAST tool and caused holes in testing coverage. These holes were due to human error,
problems in environment, where teaching was executed, and lack of knowledge. It was
wanted to find a solution, which would fill these holes permanently and ensures that all
future additions and improvements of MFWS would be included automatically or these
would be at least informed so that these could be added with minimum amount of work.
It was chosen to create an external application that simulates manual crawling. It auto-
matically introduces every request type for methods in MFWS to a selected vulnerability
scanner by sending these with suitable values to the testing vault via chosen intercep-
ting proxy. External tool was chosen to implement because this does not force to use any
specific vulnerability scanner in future.
First problem that was encountered was to find the place, where the information about
every method in MFWS, was retrieved. The web service has public documentation but it
has shortages because the documentation was not updated regularly and even in the best
case new requests will be added to documentation until the new M-Files version will be
published. The security of new requests is wanted to test before the new version so it
was never a good idea to find the information from the public documentation. The second
option would have internal documentation or list that would contain same information
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but this documentation is not available at the moment and even if it would be available it
should be updated manually. It has always possibility to human error and in the end some
request will be forgotten. For these reasons it was decided that the whole MFWS interface
was going to be parsed directly from the source code in order to ensure that every request
type was certainly introduced.
Parsing is intended to execute always when the created teaching application is executed
and it is going always to be used the source code of the M-Files version, which is going
to be tested. These gives following benefits:
• It is not needed to trust development teams that they would inform a testing team
when a new method is found from the interface.
• New methods are tested instantly after these are implemented to the interface and
possible security issues can be fixed immediately.
• Solution retrieves always all possible methods in the interface even if they are
deprecated or never used in M-Files Web including methods which are used on-
ly in M-Files Mobile.
• If older version was tested solution retrieves always only these methods, which are
usable in this specific version.
The purpose was to implement this application very generally and self-learning way with
minimum amount hard-coded parameter values. This way we minimum the amount of
modification to the application, when new methods will be implemented to MFWS, and
the application is not needed to rebuild after every addition to MFWS. Also, when the
application is even a little self-learning it is not needed to implement solution for every
method one by one but the application understand itself when the introducing succeed or
how the introduction should be changed so that it succeed next time.
The application is focused to introduce methods in MFWS than web pages in M-Files
Web. This was intended decision because security issues are more severe if these are found
from MFWS. Issues in MFWS endangers M-Files Server directly because communication
to the server are executed via MFWS. If issues are found only in M-Files Web it does not
endanger M-Files Server directly if MFWS is working correctly.
Introducing was started by introducing the positive path. In other words, it is wanted that
every introduced request succeed (Status code 200). Negative paths could also have si-
tuations, which could reveal additional vulnerabilities but this was left for future deve-
lopment. These are for examples situations where the request does not succeed because it
requires specific privileges or all preconditions are not fulfilled.
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The application provides that all possible methods in MFWS are introduced to a vulnera-
bility scanner but does not fix every problem in test execution that reduces testing cove-
rage. The second component that was created for this master thesis was a POC extension
to OWASP ZAP that tries to solve problem that exist because the scanner assumes that
the state of testing environment remains unchanged. The extension operates while scan
is on-going. It creates test object before every test execution, updates a tested request to
point to the created test object and ensures that all preconditions are fulfilled before ever
test is executed. If this concept can be proofed the same idea can be used to implement
similar extension also to other vulnerability scanner.
OWASP ZAP was selected for testing these solutions because it hasn’t been entirely sure
that the ideas that were tried to solve problems would work as expected or would be even
possible. It would not be a good idea to choose a expensive program to realize that the
ideas were not possible to implement. OWASP ZAP is open source, free to use and it is
made so that it can be easily extend without restrictions. It was good and cheap tool to try
new ideas. In the future, when the all ideas will be proven to be working and all necessary
features will be known, it will be easier to find a new vulnerability scanner tool. OWASP
ZAP has also big community so it is easy to ask and find help for problematic situations.
It is also investigated that some free or cheap vulnerability scanners works as well as very
expensive scanners [27, p. 782]. The open source codes helps also when the functionality
of scans created by different developers in open source project are wanted to verify but
also gives possibility to modify the core of the application to work better with special
situations.
6.2 Areas which are Improved
Mainly it was improved the security testing of M-Files Web Service but simultaneous-
ly it was improved the security testing of M-Files Web and M-Files mobile application
because this web service was used to implement these applications to discuss with M-
Files Server. The purpose in this thesis was not to execute security testing itself and find
new vulnerabilities but increase testing coverage so that in the future it will be possible to
find new vulnerabilities.
Improved test coverage achieved by better introduction of test area is going to be tested
by comparing the amount of introduced MFWS methods when introducing is made ma-
nually as good as possible and the amount of parsed MFWS methods by using the created
external tool for parsing to source code. Improved test coverage achieved by second com-
ponent that handle pre-conditions while active scanning is on-going is going to be tested
by finding out how many requests can be handled better with the second component and
were not tested comprehensive without the component.
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6.3 Testing Environment
The environment where the created application and the custom OWASP ZAP extension
were tested is shown in figure 6.1. It contains following applications and components:
Figure 6.1 Components and their information flows in testing environment.
DAST-Tool Teacher is the created application that was used to learn everything neces-
sary about MFWS and execute automatic session creation to DAST-tool so that tes-
ting can be started faster and it can be ensured that every time taught data is equally
comprehensive.
OWASP ZAP is the DAST tool that was used in this thesis to test the created automatic
DAST-tool Teacher and as a system for proofing how the security testing phase can
be improved by implementing an extension that prepare vault objects every time
before an attack is executed in the active scan.
M-Files ZAP Extension is the extension to ZAP that improves active scan of ZAP by
sending requests by following instructions created in DAST-Tool Teacher.
M-Files Server keeps inside the vault which is built for test DAST-Tool Teacher. The
vault is designed so that it is as simple as possible so that DAST-Tool Teacher is
easy to configure to work with it. M-Files Web is configured in the server so the
MFWS is also enabled and testing of MFWS is possible.
DAST Tool Teacher Vault Application is a vault application installed to the test vault.
There is implemented various vault extension methods for helping execution of
complex vault operations via MFWS.
6.4. DAST-Tool Teacher 61
Object Database is the database in Microsoft SQL Server that is used to convey informa-
tion between DAST-Tool Teacher and the created extension in OWASP ZAP. This
component is necessary so that same information, which is learned in DAST-Tool
Teacher, can be immediately used in the extension.
All components in the testing environment are installed in the one virtual machine but
in reality there isn’t any barriers for that. All components can be separated to own vir-
tual machines or host computers. Component locations are defined in the environment
configuration file that is read by DAST-Tool Teacher.
6.4 DAST-Tool Teacher
DAST-Tool Teacher is the application that was created to handle and automate whole
reconnaissance phase of DAST tool that was previously made manually. It retrieves and
learns whole testing area, creates requests needed to introduce and sends these requests
to a web application so that the selected DAST Tool is used as proxy Execution of DAST
Tool Teacher can split to three main phases:
1. In the first phase, all methods from MFWS are retrieved from source code and
request templates is created by using this information. This phase is explained with
more detail in section 6.4.1 Retrieving Testing Interface.
2. In the second phase, requests are built from templates by using manually defined
or template specific values and sending instructions is collected by sending the-
se requests to a test vault with different preconditions or using manually defined
instructions. This phase is explained with more detail in section 6.4.2 Learning
Phase.
3. In the third phase, all methods in MFWS are introduced to DAST tool by sending
built request following collected instructions or alone with instruction information
in the header in that case where the DAST tool is capable to handle preconditions
itself. The latter option requires always a custom extension in the DAST-Tool. This
phase is explained with more detail in section 6.4.3 Teaching Phase.
Class diagram of DAST-Tool Teacher is shown in figure 6.2. It contains only most im-
portant classes in the application and only methods and fields which are important for
understanding the functions of the class.
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Figure 6.2 Class diagram of DAST-Tool Teachers
DastToolTeacher is the class where the execution is started and it orchestrates different
phases of DAST-Tool Teacher.
RestMethodRetriever reads a given source file or files in a given folder and find and
parse REST-method definitions and creates RestRequestTemplate objects for every
method it finds.
MFWSDatabase contains information which is needed in order to resolve parameters
and elements of MFWS from the source code. All information of this class is read
from configuration file so that more information can be add without that the applica-
tion is needed to change or a new application version is needed to build.
RestRequestTemplate contains definition of one REST-like method in MFWS without
any specific parameter values.
RestRequest extends RestRequestTemplate by adding possibility to add values for para-
meters. If configured parameter values are wanted to use, values are asked from Pa-
rameterValueFactory instance that defines values which are configured to test vault
configuration file. After parameter values are set, the object contains all necessary
information that is needed to create a corresponding HTTP request.
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ParameterValueFactory gives configured parameter values and object for HTTP body
of one method when RestRequest is created from RestRequestTemplate.
Browser emulates functions of a web browser and stores cookies and tokens of login ses-
sion to MFWS. It builds proper HTTP-request by using information in RestRequest
object and sends these to M-Files vault via possible HTTP-proxy.
Session contains various Browser instances that are logged to M-Files by using different
credentials.
RestRequestSended orchestrate learning and teaching phases of DAST-Tool Teacher.
RestRequestInstructions contains sending instructions of one request so that it can be
sent to the vault so that the end condition specified in the instructions are reached.
ObjectDatabase is used to update RestRequestTemplates and RestRequestInstructions
objects to database. These classes is needed to implement ISqlObject interface.
ISqlObject is the interface for classes, which is going to be stored in database by using
ObjectDatabase.
Functionality of DAST-Tool teacher is configured and modified by using configuration
files in JSON format. This approach was selected because that way the application is more
suitable for different environments and situations. At total DAST-Tool Teacher follows
three different configuration files:
Environment Configuration contains connection, credential and location information
for every application and component in a testing environment. This includes con-
nection information of the used intercepting proxy, M-Files Web, M-Files Server
and SQL Server. These enables possibility to have every component in a separate
machine. The environment configuration file contains also parameters that are rela-
ted to these components. Like the path to the backup of the test vault, which is res-
tored to M-Files Server and credentials of several users that are used to connecting
to the vault after it is restored.
Parameter Value Configuration contains all manually configured default, template and
group specific parameter values for building RestRequest instances. The configura-
tion files is a test vault specific and is named in form <The name of test vault>.conf.
A template of this configuration file is automatically created if a new test vault,
which does not yet have a parameter value configuration file, is used. The structure
of this file is seen in figure 6.3.
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MFWS Parameters Configuration contains a search index that is used to find correct
parameter placeholders to RestRequestTemplates by using parameter names that
are used in the source code.
Figure 6.3 Structure of test vault variables JSON.
RestRequestTemplates are identified by using a string that is combination of a file name,
where the REST-method has been found, a function name that is called, when REST
method is sent and a growing number because sometimes multiple REST method calls
same or similarly named function.
Datas of RestMethodTemplates are kept also in parameter value configuration so that
identical templates from next parsing round can be easier to be identified and templates
can have small changes without that all configured parameter values are overwritten. At
the moment RestRequestTemplate identifier is the main identifier that means that proce-
dure does not work very well if the function name called by REST-method is changed.
This is considered as a different REST-method.
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6.4.1 Retrieving Testing Interface
Whole interface of MFWS was retrieved by reading through every source file, which
contains implementations of methods of MFWS. Parsing REST-methods from the source
code weren’t so complicated because all functions used as REST-method in the inter-
face was marked with RestMethod-attribute which were easy to find from source files.
Example about source code is seen in figure 6.4. All needed information of one method
was got from this attribute line and from following line, where was function definition
containing output type, function name and parameters.
Figure 6.4 RestRequestTemplates were parsed from RestMethod-attribute and a following func-
tion definition.
From parameters in RestMethod-attribute and in following function definition it was ret-
rieved following information that were then used to build RestRequestTemplate-objects:
HTTP Method HTTP method of the request was specified in the attribute in met-
hod parameter if it was some else than GET.
URL Pattern The template for URL was also specified in the attribute. The
template contains parameters that were wrapped to brackets. The-
se parameters were replaced with placeholders that define the type
parameter and make easier to replace parameters in URL pattern
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with a parameter value. For example, the placeholder of object ty-
pe id was %OBJTYPE_ID%.
URL Parameters URL parameters lists placeholders which were used in the URL
pattern. URL parameters were defined in two places in the source
code. In addition to URL pattern the same parameters were also
defined in the same order as function parameters. For resolving
the right placeholder, it was created a simple search index where
suitable placeholder was found when a parameter name in URL
pattern or in a function parameter was given. In most cases the-
se were enough but in some cases the parameters were not named
systematically either places so it was not straight forwarding to
define the right placeholder to URL pattern. For example in ma-
ny cases parameters was named only as “id” and every element in
M-Files has id so that parameter can be any element in M-Files.
It was needed to add more information to search word from pre-
vious path elements in the URL pattern. In this case search word
was a combination of the original search word and previous path
element or elements. These additional searches were done only
when previous search was inconclusive.
Request Body Type Every method, for example GET methods, didn’t have request bo-
dy. But if the request has a body the source code the type request
body was specified as a last parameter in a function definition af-
ter parameters in URL. So if there was less parameters defined in
URL template than there was in the function definition the speci-
fied method has a body. In MFWS bodies were objects which were
written to requests in JSON format by using struct classes. For this
reason, full class type used in that last function parameter was sa-
ved to identify the body. When request is built same struct class
from source code of MFWS can be used for creating correct JSON
for request body.
Body Parameters Parameters needed for a request body were retrieved by analyzing,
which parameters were used when the request body was built in
the implemented ParameterValueFactory.
Response Body Type The output type of the function definition is used to identify the
body type in the response. This information was necessary if the
response of previous requests was needed use in following requests.
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Some functions in the source code have multiple RestMethod-attribute lines. These REST-
methods use the same function and will be executed similarly. These should contains
same vulnerabilities but it was still created separate RestRequestTemplate objects because
interface was wanted to be perfect.
The solution was intended to do very generally so any special solution for one method was
not created. All special situations were solved by doing general solution that should work
also in similar special solutions in the future. This adds possibility that new methods can
be parsed without additions to parsing code. New parameter types cannot be predicted so
these needs manual work but these can be define by adding new placeholder in the search
index.
By implementing these rules in DAST-Tool Teacher it was obtained templates for all pos-
sible requests. Parsed interface contains methods which contains also requests which are
deprecated but still usable, requests which are used only in M-Files Mobile and requests
which are not used yet anywhere. Totally 393 different REST-method has been found with
this tool.
6.4.2 Learning Phase
The RestMethodTemplates that were parsed and created from source code did not ha-
ve any parameter value information. If the templates had been sent without values the
requests would never been succeeded. Random parameter values did not solve situation
either because the requests would succeed only by accident. It was wanted that requests
go deep enough in the code. Random values cause Not Found, Invalid parameter or ot-
her parameter value failures that were mostly checked at first and the execution wouldn’t
go deep enough. So in the next phase all parameter values are defined for every template
so that request can be built. At the same time sending instructions are learned for every
request for allowing that wanted end results were reached every time.
For parameter value definition it was created Test Vault Variables configuration file that
contains all parameter value definitions for every RestRequestTemplate instance. This
was followed when HTTP requests were built. Every parameter type had at least default
parameter value but additional of this it was possible to add request, template, or group
specific parameter values. Request specific parameter values were used only in internal
functionalities and cannot be defined in the configuration file. Groups were parameter
value collections where multiple parameter values were defined at once and the template
can be belong to multiple groups.
Priority of parameter values is explained in figure 6.5. Parameter values were selected
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one by one for every parameter type in the RestRequestTemplate. The application can
have specified request specific parameter values, which were used even if the template
has configured parameter values. After that it was checked template specific parameter
values. If the template didn’t have parameter value for that parameter type it was next
checked did the template belong to any group. If a group or groups were found it was
checked these groups in order to find a correct parameter value. If all previous checks
were useless default value was used instead.
Figure 6.5 Parameter value selection
It would also had been possible to define own value for every templates but when default
value definitions were used as much as possible it reduced workload notably. Parameter
values for about half of templates were defined by using only default values and big part
of rest templates were built by using parameter value groups.
RestRequests object were built from RestRequestTemplate objects by defining suitable
parameter values to the template. These contains all needed information that is needed
to build HTTP request for MFWS like a template for URL with necessary parameter ty-
pes and a class that is used to define JSON for a HTTP body. In DAST Tool Teacher,
HTTP requests were sent by using built-in HTTP libraries of .NET. Some part of MFWS
implementation was also used as help for building HTTP requests. Especially was used
struct classes for converting objects to JSON that were in request and response bodies of
MFWS. The class name that should be used in the body is saved in the RestRequestTem-
pate. This was the most important detail that influenced choice of programming language
used in DAST Tool Teacher. Otherwise all class for JSON creation should be recreated
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from scratch.
OWASP ZAP had also a method in its API that could be used to send messages through
OWASP but messages should be given in text format, which was not easiest way to con-
struct messages generally in application code. Also, this would had able to be used only
with OWASP ZAP. The current solution can be used with all vulnerability scanners, which
works as intercepting proxy. Also with current solution it was easy to send requests also
without proxy configured. Especially the learning phase was more convenient to execute
without using proxy.
Simultaneously, when parameter values were configured for RestRequestTemplates, a test
vault was built. This vault is restored to M-Files Server always before the learning phase
is started so it is always in the same state at the beginning and all its values are predictable.
It contains all M-Files objects and other settings that were used in the requests. The vault
has minimal amount of objects and multiple request operated the same object because
that way same object specific parameter values could be used in multiple requests. At first
it was tried a procedure were the request can change these common objects. However,
this was quickly abandoned because it requires that requests should be sent in a specific
order. This was changed to a procedure were parameter values only points to an object
template that were copied before the request is sent. Only copy of the common object was
modified so the common object remained unchanged. Before the request was sent, the
object specific parameter values were modified to point to this copied object. That way
the requests could be sent in an arbitrary order.
There was lot of work in parameter value definition. It was started by creating one object
to the test vault and its definitions were used as default values for every request. Then it
was checked how many requests succeed. After that new parameter values were defined
to default values. When it was encountered a situation, which couldn’t been solved by
defining default value or modifying the test vault it was started to create parameter value
groups and templates were added to these groups. Only values, which were necessary
were added to these groups. Otherwise default values were used. If parameter value was
needed only in one template also template specific default values were defined.
Multiple methods in MFWS required specific preconditions before these could be sent
successfully. For fulfilling these requirements, it was created RestRequestInstructions in
this phase. These contains all information which was needed to execute requests again
with the same steps and so that the same end condition was reached. One instruction
contains following information:
• Relationship to a main RestRequest instance, which sending instructions is defined
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Figure 6.6 The procedure that was used to construct RestRequestInstructions.
in this RestRequestInstruction.
• The type of a user that should be used when executing the request. This is neces-
sary because some methods for MFWS were intended for administrator operators.
Possible user types at the moment are basic user and vault admin user.
• A list of presteps in an execution order. Presteps are defined in the list as identifier
of the RestRequestTemplate that should be executed as a prestep. These templates
are filled with parameter values related to the main request. That way the presteps
are pointed to the same M-Files object as the main request.
• A list of poststeps in an execution order. The poststeps are defined the same way
as presteps. These steps are sent after the actual request in the instruction is sent.
Poststeps were not needed so much but when log out methods was tested it was
needed to log back in after log out succeed.
Learning was performed by following method shown in figure 6.6. At first the request
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was sent with default instructions. without presteps or poststeps and it was sent by using
a basic user without any specific privileges. Then a test object was created by finding the
template object by using object related parameter values and copying it. New test object
specific parameter values were updated to a test request. In the end the request was sent
and response is analyzed. If the end condition was reached (Status code 200) instructions
were already good enough and it is possible to continue to learn the instructions for a next
request. Otherwise some details in the instructions were automatically identified from
the error codes in responses. For example, if it is informed in the error that the object
was needed to be checked out that was added as pre step in the instructions and whole
instruction was tried again. This was continued until a end condition is reached or all ideas
are used. For requests, which pre steps and post steps cannot be identified automatically
it was added possibility to define these manually in the test vault configuration.
After the learning phase was executed and all property values and pre-steps were defined
to the every RestRequestTemplate it was achieved instructions for executing every method
in MFWS successfully. These RestRequestInstructions could be then used to introduce
every method to a vulnerability as well as possible.
6.4.3 Teaching Phase
In teaching phase, all necessary information is introduced to the vulnerability scanner so
that the attack phase can be started. This is done by following RestRequestInstructions
learned previously. These are used to create suitable requests that generates desired end
results. This also simulates better manual introduction and ensures that all complicated
features are introduced as desired.
DAST-Tool Teacher contains two different options to execute the teaching phase that are
selected by modifying environment configuration file. The first and easiest way is let
DAST-Tool Teacher handle it (Figure 6.7). Messages are sent the same way as in the
learning phase. DAST-Tools copies the template object pointed in the request, updated
the object related parameters, sends pre-steps one by one by using a user configured in
the instructions and after that sends the actual request that is going to be introduced. In
the end, requests from post-steps are sent. This is suitable teaching method for every
vulnerability scanners which work as intercepting proxy because it does not require any
additional customizations to the scanner.
The requests are authenticated similarly as M-Files Web by using cookie based authen-
tication. At the moment this is the only authentication method, which was implemented
to DAST-Tool Teacher. In the future other authentication methods can be easily imple-
ment if these are seen as necessary. Cookie-based authentication was selected because it
6.4. DAST-Tool Teacher 72
Figure 6.7 The procedure that was used to execute teaching inside DAST Tool Teacher.
is wanted to proof that is is possible to simulate similar communication as used in M-Files
Web.
The second way to execute the teaching phase is let vulnerability scanner to follow Re-
stRequestInstructions. Before teaching is started, all RestRequestInstructions are uploa-
ded to the database that is visible for the vulnerability scanner. DAST-Tool Teacher does
not follow instructions but sends only the main requests of the instructions with the iden-
tifier of the RestRequestInstruction in the request header. This same identifier was used as
key in the database so the scanner can retrieve related instructions by using this identifier.
This is more advanced option and it always requires that the scanner has custom extension
that operates teaching phase by using the given instructions. Also, when the instructions
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are given to the scanner same information can be used also in another phases of scanning.
For example, when active scanning is executed. In this master thesis this second teaching
option is tested by creating the custom extension to OWASP ZAP.
DAST Tool Teacher has also other helping tasks for OWASP ZAP. Before the teaching
phase is started a new session is created to OWASP ZAP by using .NET API of OWASP
ZAP. That way all history and site map generated in learning phase are cleaned and the
teaching phase can be executed without that garbage generated in learning phase cause
disadvantages in the following attack phase. It is wanted that after teaching phase the site
map contains all wanted items only once.
6.5 Custom OWASP ZAP Extension
The custom extension was created to OWASP ZAP so that it was able to test how precon-
ditions of requests can be handled inside a vulnerability scanner. The extension is bound
with the second teaching option of DAST Tool Teacher where the identifiers of Re-
stRequestInstructions are given with request in HTTP request header. By using these
identifiers, the extension is able to retrieve information how requests should be hand-
led and operate so that desires end results are reached. In this extension this information
was successfully used handling preconditions while introducing requests and it was proo-
fed that preconditions handling can be possible also while active scan is executed. Support
for postconditions was left for future development.
Reason for this extension was to improve the testing results and testing coverage when
using vulnerability scanner. These are improved because if the scanner itself can handle
preconditions in the attack phase the tested system is always in a better state to receive
attack strings and trigger vulnerabilities that were otherwise possible trigger only with a
manual penetration testing.
A big part of execution of the created ZAP extension is delegated to a vault application
installed to the test vault because that way existing codes of DAST-Tool Teacher can
be reused. For this reason, common parts of DAST-Tool Teacher was divided to own
library and that library was used in both DAST-Tool Teacher and DAST-Tool Teacher
Vault Application. This library contains all necessary codes, which are needed, to send
requests by following RestRequestInstructions or almost everything except source code
parsing.
The vault application was necessary to simplify the extension and reduce duplicate imple-
mentations that can cause unnecessary issues and workload. The extension part in OWASP
ZAP should be written by using Java so M-Files API cannot be used. However significant
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part of teaching phase implemented in DAST-Tool Teacher uses M-Files API. Only inter-
face, which could have been used in the extension to communicate with M-Files would
have been MFWS that is not easiest solution for complex operations. For this reason, it
was more reasonable to create a vault application where is implemented a necessary vault
extension method that executes teaching procedures by using given instruction and uses
same implementation as DAST Tool Teacher. This vault extension method are called by
ZAP extension by using MFWS but now it is enough to implement only one method call
to the extension.
Currently the vault application contains only one vault extension method ExecuteInstruc-
tions() but in the future is can contain also other vault extension methods. That implemen-
ted method takes a rest request instruction identifier and session tokens as input parame-
ters and returns an url path and body content if these are needed to update to a request.
The rest request instruction identifier is used to retrieve the related RestRequestInstruc-
tion object from the database. This object contains all necessary information to execute
pre-steps similarly as in the teaching phase executed by DAST-Tool teacher. The vault ex-
tension method requires session tokens for cookie authentication so that same session can
be used when pre-steps are executed. This is necessary especially for checkout because
this is needed to do with the same user and use the same authentication session. Otherwise
the object is not accessible.
Figure 6.8 In teaching phase the requests is sent with the instructions which OWASP ZAP then
follows.
Detailed sequence diagram how the teaching phase is executed inside OWASP ZAP is
seen in the figure 6.8. When OWASP ZAP receives a request from DAST-Tool Teacher
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it goes through different components. The teaching phase operations was implemented
as HttpSenderListener to event OnHttpRequestSend. This receives every request that was
sent forward by OWASP ZAP. If the request contains QA-RestRequestInstruction header
it is known that this request is from DAST-Tool Teacher and the teaching phase is not yet
executed. The value of this header is received and it is sent to the vault application by sen-
ding an additional request that calls the vault extension method. It executes the teaching
procedure by copying the object for testing from template object that is found from the in-
structions and executing all pre-steps if the instructions guide so. When the response from
the vault extension method is arrived, it is known that all steps for correct preconditions
are executed. If the request from DAST-Tool Teacher is needed to modify, the response
from the vault extension method contains values for the URL path and the body. Otherwi-
se these values in the response are empty. These modifications are needed for example if
the request should point to a new object or a version of the object is increased because
the object was check out. When preconditions are fine and the request from DAST-Tool
teacher is updated the request can be sent to the test vault. This should now produce the
wanted end results and wanted request and response to the site map that still contains
information about the instructions in the same header field for repeating this sequence
again. Current solution in the extension does not implement post conditions but if this is
wanted to be supported in the future this can be implement to OnHttpResponseReceive
event in HttpSenderListener.
With this extension, the preconditions of the request in the teaching phase were success-
fully handled inside OWASP ZAP. However this didn’t gave much advantage comparing
when preconditions were handled inside DAST-Tool Teacher because final conditions
were almost identical. This solution cause little less unnecessary items to the site map
because it does not contain request and responses, which are sent as pre-steps. This speed
up a little the scanning because every request type found only once in the site map. Even
if advantages were minimal this was a necessary step so that OWASP ZAP could handle
pre-steps itself. Next it is explained how the same handling is implemented in active scan.
Teaching phase was implement in HTTPSenderListener but this was not suitable place
when the same instruction procedure was wanted to use in the active scan. HttpSender-
Listeners are executed after the active scan sends request so if the procedure had been
executed in HttpSenderListener an attack that the active scan has made to the request
would have been overwritten because the procedure overwrites almost every time the
URL and the body of the request. For this reason, it was needed to find way to execu-
te the procedure before the active scan has made its own changes. ScannerHook that is
another place for custom implementation has event listeners that are closer to active scan
but these are also triggered after the active scan has made its changes. Right place where
the procedure was wanted to execute would be after the active scan copies a request from
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the site map but before the active scan has made an attack to the request. OWASP ZAP
extensibility do not have yet possibility to add custom modifications here.
Because the wanted customization place wasn’t available it was started to investigate the
source code of OWASP ZAP and also tested how easy it would be to build OWASP ZAP
from the source code with wanted modifications. There were good instructions how to
build OWASP ZAP and it worked out easily. Modifications were wanted to implement
as event handled that is possible to register in an extension so that modification does no
change basic functionalities of OWASP ZAP only improves extensibility support.
Figure 6.9 Implemented AfterNewMsgCloned event listener to ScannerHook. It is executed before
cloned request is given to Active Scanner.
The custom event handler, which should add wanted extensibility support, was imple-
mented to ScannerHook that already contains extensibility possibilities for active scan
and was implemented to the same classes where the custom event handler had to be ad-
ded. The name of the new event handled is AfterNewMsgCloned(). It is triggered while
newMsg()-method is called by a scan just before the cloned request is given forward. The
place of the method is seen also in figure 6.9. That way the preconditions can be executed
and the request can be modified before it is given to the scan and any attacks created by
the scan is newer overwritten. That new change brought a lot of unanswered questions
because it wasn’t clear how OWASP ZAP and all scans behaves if the request is changed
in the middle of everything.
Parameters of the AfterNewMsgCloned() event handed method are similar as the parame-
ters of other methods that were already exist in ScannerHook base class. Event handled
allows to change the HTTP request that was going to be given forward and it has HTTP-
Sender instance that can be used to for additional requests.
This new event handled was utilized in the custom OWASP ZAP extension where the teac-
hing phase was already implemented. The implementation of AfterNewMsgCloned()method
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was quite simple and it resemble the similar implementation in HttpSenderListener. When
this implementation was tested the pre-steps were successfully sent while active scan was
executed but modifications contains also side effects. First it was notices that OWASP
ZAP tests also sub paths of existing request in the site map. For example if the URL of a
request is
http://www.domain.com/REST/objects/0/123/3/properties
it is also tested sub URLs
http://www.domain.com/REST/objects/0/123/3
http://www.domain.com/REST/objects/0/123/
http://www.domain.com/REST/objects/0/
http://www.domain.com/REST/objects/
and so on. Headers for these sub requests were copied from the original request so al-
so the header QA-RestRequestInstruction was copied to all these sub requests. The cus-
tom extension blindly trust this header and thinks that all these request are the same
request. It execute the same pre-steps and overwrite the URLs if necessary. This causes
two problems. Sub requests is not tested well because often the URL is overwritten with
URL that does not resemble the same request type. Also some request types are tested
unnecessary multiple times.
This problem was fixed by creating a new API method to the REST API of OWASP ZAP.
It reads through the whole site map and removes QA-RestRequestInstruction header from
all requests, which were not directly sent by DAST Tool Teacher. This method can be
called manually via OWASP ZAP web UI for REST API or any implemented API. For
example, .NET API that is used in DAST Tool Teacher. The intention is that this would
be called in DAST Tool Teacher after all requests is sent in the teaching phase.
Other problem that was encountered, when the solution was tested, was that when mul-
tiple requests were scanned simultaneously quite often the scan never completed. The
reason was that the active scanner began to loop the same request types over and over
again. The certain reason for never ending loop is not yet known but it is assumed that the
reason is a new request in the site map that was added while active scanning is on-going
because it has triggered a new vulnerability. This hasn’t causes problems when the URL
of the request hasn’t been changed but when the custom extension changes the URL the
request appears after the current request in the site map. The active scanner is encounte-
red this issue again later and find the same vulnerability again. The triggering request is
again added to the site map after the current request and so on. Because of this reliability
problem the solution could not be tested very comprehensive. With single requests and
small sets, the solutions seems to work as expected but when all request were tested at
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once it always ended up never ending loop.
6.6 Results
Retrieving test content from source code worked out perfectly. Every method of MFWS
is now known and are in a form that can be used to build HTTP requests that calls these
methods. Totally it was retrieved and introduced information of 393 methods. This amount
was significantly bigger than amount achieved when the pre-attack phase was executed
manually through M-Files Web. Amount of different request types were then somewhere
between 175-200. When the improvement is calculated in percentage
393/175=2.246... → +125%
393/200=1.965 → +97%
it is got that totally testing coverage has been improved even 125 percent. Amounts in
manual way differ because manual introduction can be executed in many ways and every
execution is slightly different. Sometimes all features are remembered to crawl but so-
metimes the interface was introduced only partially because everything is not remembe-
red. Also, multiple request types were multiple times in the site node that increased total
testing time. By using the new solution, the site map is always complete and contains
immediately also all new additions to MFWS even if there were not used anywhere.
By copying always the object that a method operates from template isolates the scanning
of the method to one M-Files object that other methods can modify only by accident. This
increase effectiveness of the scan because this reduces unexpected modifications to M-
Files objects that may prevent that vulnerabilities are revealed. This method improves the
scan effectiveness of 163 methods that operates a M-Files object directly.
The results of second component, the custom extension in OWASP ZAP, is a more difficult
to diagnose because it isn’t yet perfect. But in the future, it should improve the scanning
of requests, which requires pre-steps. Totally MFWS has 39 methods, which requires pre-
steps. After the custom extension is fixed it will improve the scanning of the these methods
and the scanning will be improved by
39/393=0.099
10 percent.
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6.7 Development ideas
In this master thesis, it was not focused to verify how well OWASP ZAP finds real vul-
nerabilities from web applications but it was ensured that there isn’t any problems, which
could prevent finding vulnerabilities, in a way how the attack surface was introduces or
active scan was executed. DAST-Tool Teacher automates the reconnaissance phase of
MFWS penetration testing but didn’t automate rest phases so that MFWS can be scanned
without any human intervention. It has been wanted that some day the penetration tes-
ting would be automated but there is still very long way to a situation where the whole
penetration testing of MFWS is fully automated.
At first, before any automation could be though, it should be ensured that the scanner
really finds vulnerabilities and does not give too much false positive alarms. This requires
multiple steps. All problems exist in the custom extension while active scan is ongoing
should be fixed. The existing scans in OWASP should be verify for that they really find
vulnerabilities or own scans should be created that fits better to the structure or MFWS
and tests application specific vulnerabilities. Testing time could be shortened by disabling
unnecessary scans. For example, if it is known that only MSSQL and Firebird can be used
as database for M-Files vault is not necessary to test attack vectors, focus for attacking
MySQL server. It is also pointless to test XSS vulnerabilities by using OWASP ZAP or
using some other DAST tool that scans requests one by one because the responses of
MFWS always are sent without escaping because actual escaping is left for a web page,
which shows the content. These vulnerabilities should be covered by using some other
testing tool. It would be also important to consider other vulnerability scanners and review
could one of these to function better in our case and plan. OWASP ZAP was selected only
because it was good tool for testing different concepts. All requirements, which this new
tool should have, are now better known so the selection will be easier than before this
thesis. In any case any DAST tool cannot find every vulnerability from the application so
manual penetration testing is always needed.
The penetration testing of MFWS can be automated by using OWASP ZAP but also ot-
her tools should be considered. However, OWASP ZAP has all required commands in
its REST API. The commands can be called by using DAST-Tool Teacher or it can be
created another tool that orchestrates every phase. The reconnaissance phase was already
implemented in DAST-Tool Teacher so this phase is already done. The phases, which still
require automation, is the attack phase and the post-attack phase. In the attack phase, the
active scanner should be programmatically started and the execution should be followed
so that its progress can be forwarded and it is known when it is completed. In the post
attack phase all found issues should be gone through and all clearly false positive alarms
should be discarded before results is shown. Additional of these, procedure that builds
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testing environment should be created. This install newest M-Files version, DAST-Tool
Teacher and other necessary applications to a virtual machine, downloads related source
codes of MFWS to a place where DAST-Tool Teacher can retrieve these and starts the
testing procedure.
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7. CONCLUSION
The goal of this master thesis was to study basic functionalities of standalone vulnerability
scanners for web applications and identify problems and technical challenges that occurs
when M-Files Web Service were tested by using these scanners. Problems were found
from the way how the attack surface was currently introduced to the scanner and from
common way how the active scan is executed in a vulnerability scanner by testing requests
one by one without considering preconditions.
Vulnerability scanners are used as help in manual penetration testing but additional of this
many vulnerability scanners can be used also as standalone mode that automatically test
several vulnerabilities without that testers needed to now anything about security testing.
It was learned that standalone vulnerability scanners are easy to use but have limitations
that should be keep in mind when the scan is performed. Standalone vulnerability scanners
can find only vulnerabilities, which has detectable signature and cannot found vulnerabi-
lities related to logic flaws and vulnerabilities, which require that the functionality of web
application is understood. Request are tested one by one that means that it is not revealed
vulnerabilities, which requires specific steps and preconditions. If the security testers are
not aware about limitations of standalone vulnerability scanner it causes false conclusions
about the security level of the system because the system can still have vulnerabilities that
aren’t found via vulnerability scanner. Experienced manual penetration tester can usually
find these vulnerabilities but if the system is big it is not reasonable or even possible to
manually penetration test the system totally. For these situations vulnerability scanners
are essential.
When current testing habits were analyzed, it was learned that current way to introduce
the public M-Files Web Service HTTP API by manually crawling through M-Files Web
didn’t introduce whole M-Files Web Service. Main reason was that M-Files Web Service
was used also in M-Files mobile applications and in third-party applications and for these
reason it contains methods that were not used in M-Files Web. These holes in security
testing was wanted to fill and to create a final solution that can be used also when the
penetration testing will be automated. It was decided to create external application, that
parses needed information directly from the source code where MFWS was implemen-
ted and send all needed requests through the vulnerability scanner with valid values and
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necessary pre-steps. That way introduced the attack surface will be always up-to-date and
every new method to M-Files Web Service will be tested immediately.
Another problems that was identified was due to the common way how vulnerability
scanners execute the active scan. When a scanner scans requests by sending each request
multiple times it does take care that the tested system is every time in the best state to
reveal vulnerabilities. When requests does not succeed, vulnerabilities were sought only
from the part that validates parameters and object state and only small part of source code
was covered. When penetration testing is executed manually penetration testers try diffe-
rent scenarios and sequences to reveal vulnerabilities. This same procedure was wanted
to implement when penetration testing was executed automatically by using vulnerability
scanner. This meant that the same pre-steps that were identified in the external application
was needed to executed inside the vulnerability scanner when active scanner was execu-
ted. This method was tested by creating POC extension to OWASP ZAP. Even if OWASP
ZAP has wide extensibility possibilities it was realized that it didn’t has the needed event
listener but because OWASP ZAP was open source application this custom event liste-
ner was able to implement and solution was able to test. It was proofed that it is possible
to executed pre-steps before every attack executed by active scanner but custom exten-
sion causes side effect, which were not yet solved. The solution works with small sets but
when wider attack surface was tested the scan ends to loop that never ends. This problem
is needed to solve before the solution can be used in the production.
Information security and security testing is important for software companies like M-
Files even if their own confidential information is not in danger because bad reputation in
security reduces market value and future sales or causes fines and lawsuits from poorly
implemented security practices. For M-Files the security is especially important because
they create a software that is intended for storing all existing information of a corporation
especially most important and confidential data. Their customers rely on that the security
of M-Files is in good shape, but even one bad news causes that current and potential
customers lose their confidence in M-Files. Security of the software can be improved
by raising awareness about security among developers and invest a good security testing
team or purchase the security testing from a third party company that is focused and are
experts in security testing. This master thesis has improved security testing but there is
still lot of work. In any case security testing cannot be forgotten. It should be always as
important as ordinary testing.
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